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JUDICIAL SELECTION: THE SEARCH
FOR QUALITY AND
REPRE SENTATIVENE SS
Robert P. Davidow*
In this Article, Professor Davidow examines the selection of judges in the United
States, both historical and currentl. 4fier identfying the twin goals ofselection as
quality and representativeness, Professor Davidow offers a critique of the abiliy of
the current selection systems to effectuate thesepolicy goals. Merit selection, both of
state andfederaljudges, receives particular attention. Finally, Professor Davidow
offersfourproposals to improve judicial selection which suggest dftering degrees of
public participation in the selection process. Professor Davidow then concludes that
thepresent methods of judicial selection are inadequate and that the adoption of new
selection techniques would ensure the appointment of higher quality judges who
would be representative of the wider community.
INTRODUCTION
ALTHOUGH THE literature concerning judicial selection in
the United States is voluminous,' most commentators assume
* Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law. B.A., Dartmouth
College (1959); J.D., University of Michigan (1962); LL.M., Harvard (1969).
This Article is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of the Science of Law conferred by the Faculty of Law, Columbia University.
1. The best bibliographies of recent materials are annotated bibliographies: N.
CHINN & L. BERKSON, LITERATURE ON JUDICIAL SELECTION (1980); 1 F. KLEIN, THE
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN THE COURTS 275-301 (1976). Other helpful bibliogra-
phies are R. DAHL & C. BOLDEN, THE AMERICAN JUDGE 38-68 (1968); S. Escovrrz, JUDI-
CIAL SELECTION AND TENURE 48-58 (Am. Jud. Soe'y 1975); Wheeler & Whitcomb, The
Literature of Court Administration .4 Bibliographical Essay, 1974 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 689,
696-700.
Significant recent works on judicial selection include: A. ASHMAN & J. ALFINI, THE
KEY TO JUDICIAL MERIT SELECTION: THE NOMINATING PROCESS (1974); L. BERKSON, S.
BETTER & M. GRIMALDI, JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE UNITED STATES: A COMPENDIUM
OF PROVISIONS (1981); L. BERKSON & S. CARBON, UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE NOMI-
NATING COMMISSION: ITS MEMBERS, PROCEDURES AND CANDIDATES (1980); H. CHASE,
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that the principal methods of selection used today-partisan elec-
tion, nonpartisan election, executive appointment, legislative
appointment (election), and merif selection-constitute an exhaus-
tive list of possibilities. Discussion, therefore, is confined to the
arguments in favor of or against one or more of these methods of
selection. This Article demonstrates, however, that these selection
techniques do not lead to the selection of judges of the highest
quality who possess beliefs, attitudes, and values that are broadly
FEDERAL JUDGES (1972); E. COSTIKYAN, BEHIND CLOSED DOORS (1966); J. GROSSMAN,
LAWYERS AND JUDGES (1965); D. STEIN, JUDGING THE JUDGES (1974); R. WATSON & R.
DOWNING, THE POLITICS OF THE BENCH AND THE BAR (1969); JUDICIAL SELECTION AND
TENURE (G. Winters ed. 1973); Adamany & Dubois, Electing State Judges, 1976 Wis. L.
REv. 731; Allard, Application of the Missouri Court Plan to Judicial Selection and Tenure in
America Today, 15 BUFFALO L. REV. 378 (1966); Berkson, Carbon & Neff, A Study ofthe
U.S. Circuit Judge Nominating Commission, 63 JUDICATURE 104 (1979); Burnett, Observa-
tions on the Direct-Election MethodofJudicial Selection, 44 TEx. L. REv. 1098 (1966); Fish,
Merit Selection and Politics: Choosing a Judge of the United States Court of4ppealsfor the
Fourth Circuit, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 635 (1979); Garwood, Democracy andthe Popular
Election of Judges.- n Argument, 16 Sw. L.J. 216 (1962); Glick, The Promise and the Per-
formance of the Missouri Plan: Judicial Selection in the Ffty States, 32 U. MIAMI L. REv.
509 (1978); Greenhill & Odam, Judicial Reform of Our Texas Courts-4 Reexamination of
Three Important Aspects, 23 BAYLOR L. REV. 204 (1971); Harding, The Casefor Partisan
Election o/Judges, 55 A.B.A. J. 1162 (1969); Henderson & Sinclair, The Selection ofJudges
in Texas, 5 Hous. L. REV. 430 (1968); Hunter, A Missouri Judge Pews Judicial Selection
and Tenure, 48 J. AM. JUD. SOC'Y 126 (1964); Kaminsky, Available Compromisesfor Con-
tinued Judicial Selection Reform, 53 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 466 (1979); Kaminsky, Judicial
Selection: Alternatives to the Status Quo in the Selection of State Court Judges, 48 ST.
JOHN'S L. REv. 496 (1974); Kaminsky,4 Proposalfor Mandatory Preselection Screeningfor
State Court Judges, 51 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 516 (1977); Lowe, Voluntary Merit Selection
Plans, 55 JUDICATURE 161 (1971); Mans, Selecting the '"idden Judiciary' How the Merit
Process Works in ChoosingAdministrative Judges (pts. 1-2), 63 JUDICATURE 60, 130 (1979);
Niles, The Changing Politics of Judicial Selection: 4 Merit Plan/or New York, 22 REC.
N.Y.C.B.A. 242 (1967); O'Connell & Means, ShouldJudges be Selectedby Merit Plans? Yes
... 40 FLA. B.J. 1146 (1966); Prendergast & Costikyan, Judicial Selection-The Prender-
gast Plan, N.Y.L.J., March 22, 1967, at 4, col. 1; March 23, 1967, at 4, col. 1; March 24,
1967, at 4, col. 1; Robertson & Gordon, Merit Screening of Judges in Massachusetts: The
Experience of the Ad Hoc Committee, 58 MASS. L.Q. 131 (1973); Roth, Why I am Against
the Caliornia Merit Plan, The Missouri Plan-Or Any Reasonable Facsimile Thereof, 42 J.
ST. B. CAL. 346 (1967); Seiler, Judicial Selection in New Jersey, 5 SETON HALL L. REV. 721
(1974); Spaeth, Reflections on a Judicial Campaign, 60 JUDICATURE 10 (1976); Spence,
Should Judges be Selected by Merit Plan? No..., 40 FLA. B.J. 1147 (1966); Santon, Why I
Am/for the California Merit Plan, 42 J. ST. B. CAL. 356 (1967); Stevenson, 'Reform" and
Judicial Selection, 64 A.B.A. J. 1683 (1978); Voorhees, It's Time for Merit Selection of
Supreme Court Justices, 61 A.B.A. J. 705 (1975); Waltz, Some Firsthand Observations on
the Election of Judges, 63 JUDICATURE 184 (1979); Winters & Allard, Two Dozen Miscon-
ceptionsAbout Judicial Selection and Tenure, 48 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y 138 (1964); Note,Analy-
sis of Methods of Judicial Selection and Tenure, 6 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 955 (1972); Note,
Judicial Selection in the States: 4 Critical Study With Proposalsfor Reform, 4 HOFSTRA L.
RaV. 267 (1976); Comment, Selection and Discipline of State Judges in Texas, 14 Hous. L.
REv. 672 (1977).
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representative of the community.2 The Article also contains sev-
eral proposals for judicial selection designed to achieve these twin
goals of quality and representativeness?
Three of the four proposals resemble the present system of
merit selection in that they entrust a commission with the duty of
nominating persons for a judicial vacancy.4 The three proposals
differ from that system of merit selection, however, in that they
provide both for selection of at least some commissioners on the
judicial nominating commissions through a system of propor-
tional representation and for final selection of judges by lot from
among the nominees.' A fourth proposal, which also provides for
final selection by lot, allows the electorate even more direct partic-
ipation by permitting it to choose the nominees under a system of
proportional representation.6
First, however, it is necessary to consider three preliminary
matters: the methods by which judges have been and are being
selected,7 whether quality and representativeness are appropriate
goals of a system of judicial selection,' and whether the current
methods of judicial selection adequately achieve these goals.9
I. JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE UNITED STATES-THE BROAD
PICTURE' 0
In colonial America, judges were appointed and could be re-
2. See notes 10-122 infra and accompanying text.
3. See notes 123-82 infra and accompanying text.
4. See notes 154-82 infra and accompanying text.
5. See notes 154-78 infra and accompanying text.
6. See note 178 infra and accompanying text.
7. See notes 10-50 infra and accompanying text.
8. See notes 51-90 infra and accompanying text.
9. See notes 91-122 infra and accompanying text.
10. This Article will make no effort to trace historically the development of the
professional judge. Professional judges, as they exist today, did not exist in either ancient
Greece or Rome. The Athenian archon, selected by lot, had authority merely to determine
whether the litigant was in the proper court and the date for trial. The trial itself was held
before dikasts-numerous lay persons selected by lot to serve for a year. 4 G. GROTE, A
HISTORY OF GREECE 438-86 (1888, 1st A.M.S. ed. 1971); J. HEADLAm, ELECTION By LOT
AT ATHENS 145-153 (1933). The Roman praetor more closely resembled a modem
judge; the praetor, however, served only a year and regarded this position as merely a step
in a career involving important governmental service. J. DAWSON, THE ORACLES OF THE
LAw 104-05 (1968). Today's judges are selected by two principal methods: appointment
and election. A third method, however, was used for the selection of persons performing
judicial functions in ancient Greece; selection by lot was used during the fourth and fifth
centuries B.C. for selection of dikasts-numerous persons who determined both the law
and the facts. 4 G. GROTE, supra. Some form of appointment has been the predominant
method of selection today and is the norm outside the United States. Indeed, apart from
1981]
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moved by the Crown."I The lack of judicial independence result-
ing from this Royal power of removal was one of the grievances
cited in the Declaration of Independence.' 2 Following the
Revolution, the colonies established systems of judicial selection
based on executive appointment, subject to confirmation or ap-
proval by some other body,' 3 or legislative selection. In eight of
the original thirteen colonies, however, judges were given life ten-
ure.14 In fact, Article III of the Constitution effectively mandated
life tenure for federal judges following executive appointment. 15
A feature of the era of Jacksonian democracy in the nineteenth
century was a trend, especially among the newly admitted states,
toward the popular election of judges, with limited terms.'6 Some
of the eastern states, however, retained judicial selection based on
gubernatorial or legislative life appointments."
the Federal Constitutional Court of West Germany, the members of which are elected by
bodies of the legislature and then formally appointed by the federal president in
accordance with the legislature's vote (Schram, The Recruitment of Judgesfor the West
German Federal Courts, 21 AM. J. COMP. L. 691, 693 (1973)), the most universal method of
selection is by executive appointment. Mueller & Griffiths, Judicial Fitness. A Comparative
Study, 52 JUDICATURE 199, 202-04 (1968). In England, for example, the highest judges are
appointed by the Crown on the recommendation of the Prime Minister; lower court judges
are appointed by the Crown on the advice of the Lord Chancellor. R. WALKER & M.
WALKER, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 196 (4th ed. 1976). In France, where judges are
part of the civil service, formal appointment is by the President of the Republic, who must
select from a list submitted by a commission consisting of judges and officials from the
Ministry of Justice. G. VERPRAET, LE JUGE-CET INCONNU 64 (1975); [BULLETIN OF THE]
ECOLE NATIONALE DE LA MAGISTRATURE 55-56 (1975).
11. See, e.g., Smith, An Independent Judiciary: The Colonial Background, 124 U. PA.
L. REV. 1104 (1976); Winters, Selection ofJudges-4n Historical Introduction, 44 TEx. L.
REV. 1081 (1966).
12. "He [The King] has made judges dependent on his Will alone, for the tenure of
their offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries." Declaration of Independence,
art. II, § ix.
13. See, e.g., Nelson, Variations On a heme-Selection and Tenure fJudges, 36 S.
CAL. L. REV. 4, 14 (1962).
14. Id
15. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 1. The Constitution also provides for impeachment of civil
officers. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4. Whether impeachment is the sole method by which
United States judges may be removed is disputable. Compare Snarr & Parker, The "Good
Behavior" Alternative to Impeachment: A Proposalfor the More Effective Use ofJudicial
Councils, 4 J. CONTEMP. L. 38 (1977), with Note, Judicial Disability and the Good Behavior
Clause, 85 YALE L.J. 706 (1976).
16. A. ASHMAN & J. ALFINI, supra note 1, at 9.
17. Presently three states provide for life tenure. In Massachusetts and New Hamp-
shire, the governor appoints judges for life, subject to mandatory retirement at age seventy,
and must obtain the approval of the council. MAss. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 2, § I, art. 9; and pt.
2, ch. 3, art. 1 (Presently, a voluntary merit selection plan is being implemented. See Note
16, infra);N.H. CONST. pt. 2, arts. 46, 47, 73. In Rhode Island, Supreme Court justices are
"elected by the two houses in grand committee" R.I. CONST. art. 10, § 4; trial court judges
Vol. 31:409
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In 1914, a proposal was made to combine the supposedly best
elements of appointment and popular election:' 8 appointment
from a list of candidates proposed by a nominating commission,
followed by'periodic retention elections. In 1940, Missouri
adopted a refinement of this "merit selection" plan.' 9 Originally,
this plan called for the gubernatorial appointment of one of the
three nominees submitted by a judicial nominating commission
composed of three lawyers, elected by members of the State Bar
Association; three lay persons, appointed by the governor; and the
chief justice of the Missouri Supreme Court.2" After a specified
period in office, each judge had to run in a retention election in
which voters could vote only for or against the judge and not for
another candidate; if the judge failed to receive a majority of the
vote, a new judicial selection process was commenced.21
Today, the picture of state judicial selection is confused, in
part because of a trend toward experimentation with the use of
some form of merit selection for only some courts in a particular
state, and sometimes for only interim vacancies. Furthermore,
this experimentation has been undertaken sometimes constitution-
ally,22 sometimes statutorily,23 and sometimes informally (as in
the case of a governor's decision voluntarily to select from among
are appointed by the governor with the approval of the Senate. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-2-2
(Supp. 1978).
18. Albert M. Kales, one of the founders of the American Judicature Society, made
the original proposal. Kales proposed that a judicial council prepare a list of eligible law-
yers from which an elected chief justice would choose. Judges thus selected would be re-
quired periodically to run against their record; that is, the question whether they should be
retained would be placed on the ballot. The original plan is found in A. KALES, UNPOPU-
LAR GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, 239, 245-47, 249-50 (1914). Later, Harold
Laski suggested that the governor be substituted for the elected chief justice as the ap-
pointer. A. ASHMAN & J. ALFINI, supra note 1, at 11 (citing Laski, The Technique of Judi-
cial Appointment, 24 MICH. L. REV. 529, 539 (1926)). In 1937, the American Bar
Association adopted, in principle, the Kales proposal, as modified. 23 A.B.A. J. 105, 108
(1937).
19. Nelson, supra note 13, at 18.
20. The present Missouri plan differs only in that the judicial member is now a mem-
ber of the Supreme Court elected by the other members of the Supreme Court. Mo.
CONsT. art. 5, § 25(a)-(d).
21. Nelson, supra note 13, at 18.
22. ALA. CONST. amend. 83; ALAS. CONST. art. 4, §§ 5, 8; ARiz. CONsT. art. 6, § 36;
COLO. CONsT. art. 6, §§ 20, 24; FLA. CONST. art. 5, § 11; HAWAII CONsT. art. 6, §§ 3, 4;
IND. CONST. art. 7, §§ 9, 10; IOWA CONsT. art. 5, §§ 15, 16; KAN. CONsT. art. 3, § 2; Ky.
CONST. §§ 117, 118; Mo. CONST. art. 5, § 25(a)-(d); MONT. CONST. art. 7, § 8; NEB. CONST.
art. 5, § 21; NEV. CONST. art. 6, § 20; N.Y. CONST. art. 6, § 2; N.D. CONsT. art. 4, § 13;
OKLA. CONST. art. 7-B, §§ 3, 4; VT. CONST. ch. 2, § 32; WYO. CONsT. art. 5, § 4.
23. D.C. CODE app. §§ 433, 434 (1973 & Supp. V 1978); IDAHO CODE §§ 1-2101 to
2102 (1979); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 17-701 to 716 (Supp. 1979).
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a list of nominees prepared by a nominating commission).2 4
The following methods of judicial selection are now being uti-
lized in the several states (with some states using more than one
method of selection): partisan election;25 nonpartisan election;26
gubernatorial appointment or nomination,27 with confirmation or
consent required by the state senate,28 legislature,29 or a council °
24. An unpublished state-by-state compilation prepared by the American Judicature
Society, July 1, 1979, shows the following voluntary plans: Delaware (by executive order
issued in 1977); Georgia (interim vacancies); Maryland (interim vacancies on court of ap-
peals, court of special appeals, circuit courts, district courts, and supreme bench of Balti-
more City, based on executive order of 1979); Massachusetts (ad hoc judicial selection
committee); Minnesota (for vacancies in county and district courts by executive order of
1979); New York (voluntary me.it selection for interim vacancies by executive order of
1975); North Carolina (superior court interim vacancies or new judgeships by executive
order of 1977); Oklahoma (trial judge interim vacancies by executive order of 1967); Penn-
sylvania (interim vacancies and newly created offices by executive order of 1973, as modi-
fied in 1975); South Dakota (interim vacancies by executive order of 1977).
In addition, the Mayor of New York has used a voluntary scheme of merit selection for
criminal and family court judges in New York City since 1962. A. ASHMAN & J. ALFINI,
supra note 1, at 130-50. Voluntary plans as of 1976 are outlined in Note, Judicial Selection
in the States: A Critical Study With Proposals far Reform, 4 HOFSTRA L. REV. 267, 330
(Georgia), 333 (Maryland), 334 (Massachusetts), 337 (New York), 338 (Oklahoma trial
courts and Pennsylvania), 339 (South Carolina). For a report on the operation of President
Carter's voluntary method of merit selection of judges for the United States Courts of
Appeals, see L. BERKSON & S. CARBON, supra note 1.
25. ARK. CONsT. art. 7, §§ 6, 17; GA. CODE ANN. § 24-2602 (1976); ILL. CONST. art. 6,
§ 12(a); IND. CONST. art. 7, § 7; KAN. CONsT. art. 3, § 6; Ky. CONST. §§ 99, 160, LA.
CONsT. art. 5, § 22; Miss. CONsT. art. 6, §§ 145, 153; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 478.010 (Vernon
Supp. 1979); N.M. CONsT. art. 6, §§ 4, 12, 28; N.Y. CONST. art. 6, § 6; N.C. CONST. art. 4,
§§ 10, 16; PA. CONsT. art. 5, § 13; TENN. CONsT. art. 6, §§ 3, 4; TEX. CONST. art. 5, § 7; W.
VA. CONsT. art. 8, §§ 2, 5.
26. ARIz. CONST. art. 6, § 12; CAL. CONsT. art. 6, § 16(b); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 105.011
(West Supp. 1974-1978); IDAHO CONsT. art. 5, §§ 6, 11; Ky. CONST. § 117; MICH. CONST.
art. 6, §§ 2, 8, 12; MINN. CONsT. art. 6, § 7; MONT. CONsT. art. 7, § 8; NEV. CONST. art. 6,
§§ 3, 5; N.D. CONsT. art. 4, §§ 7, 9; OHIO CONST. art. 4, § 6; OKLA. CONST. art. 7, § 9; OR.
CONsT. art. 7, § I; S.D. CONST. art. 5, § 7; UTAH CODE ANN. § 20-1-7.7 (Supp. 1979);
WASH. CONST. art. 4, §§ 3, 5; Wis. CONsT. art. 7, §§ 4, 5, 6.
27. The reference here is to gubernatorial appointment in the first instance. CAL.
CONST. art. 6, § 16; DEL CONST. art. 4, § 3; ME. CONST. art. 5, pt. I, § 8; MD. CONST. art. 4,
§ 5A; MAss. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 2, § 1, art. 9; N.H. CONST. pt. 2, arts. 46, 47; N.J. CONST. art.
6, § 6, I. Such appointments by the governor are to be distinguished from interim ap-
pointments, which are very common in the case of nonpartisan or partisan election. Eg.,
MICH. CONsT. art. 6, § 23 (nonpartisan election with interim gubernatorial appointment);
Miss. CONST. art. 7, § 177 (gubernatorial appointment for interim vacancies with partisan
election).
28. MD. CONST. art. 4, § 5A; N.J. CONST. art. 6, § 6, 1.
29. CONN. CONST. art. 5, §§ 2, 3 (in form, the legislature "appoints." following the
governor's nomination; in substance, it would seem that the governor appoints, and the
legislature approves by concurrent resolution of each house); ME. CONST. art. 5, pt. 1, § 8
(following gubernatorial appointment, a committee of both houses of the legislature makes
a recommendation; this recommendation can be overridden only by a two-thirds vote in
the Senate).
30. MAss. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 2, § 1, art. 9; N.H. CONST. pt. 2, arts. 46, 47.
1981] JUDICIAL SELECTION 415
or commission;3' legislative election or appointment;32 appoint-
ment of inferior court judges by a superior court judge or judges; 33
and some form of merit selection.34
The picture, however, is even more complicated than this list
might suggest. In some instances of gubernatorial appointment,
for example, the governor voluntarily has used a screening com-
mittee, which evaluates candidates whose names are submitted by
the governor,35 as opposed to a nominating committee or commis-
sion, which recruits and evaluates candidates.36 The forms of
merit selection also have differed markedly in regard to the com-
position of the nominating commission. The number of commis-
sioners, for example, has varied from five37 to twenty-four. 38 The
proportion of lawyers has varied from a majority39 to a minority
31. CAL. CONST. art. 6, § 16(d).
32. R.I. CONST. art. 10, § 4 ("elected by the two houses in grand committee"); S.C.
CONsT. art. 5, § 3 ("elected by joint public vote of the General Assembly"); VA. CONST. art.
6, § 7 ("chosen by the vote of a majority of the members elected to each house").
33. ILL. CONST. art. 6, § 8; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-171 (Supp. 1979). United States
magistrates also are chosen by the district courts in which they serve. 28 U.S.C. § 631
(1976).
34. See notes 22-24 supra and accompanying text. In addition, Congress has recently
provided for the merit selection of United States magistrates. Federal Magistrate Act of
1979, Pub. L. No. 96-82, § 3, 93 Stat. 644 (1979) (to be codified in 28 U.S.C. § 631).
35. The governors of the following states voluntarily use a screening procedure for
initial or interim appointments: Arkansas, Connecticut, Michigan, New Jersey, and New
Mexico. Unpublished state-by-state compilation prepared by American Judicature Soci-
ety, July 1, 1979. In addition, North Carolina provides that the Governor is to fill interim
vacancies by appointing from among those candidates nominated by the bar of the perti-
nent judicial district. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-142 (Supp. 1979).
36. Ashman and Alfini distinguish a screening committee from a nominating commis-
sion that is part of a merit selection plan:
Given the primary concern of this study with the structure, procedures and duties
of the judicial nominating commissions, the nonpartisan merit selection plan is
defined for our purposes as a judicial selection system which employs:
A permanent nonpartisan commission of lawyers and non-lawyers that initialy
and independently generates, screens and submits a list ofjudicial nominees to an
official who is legally or voluntarily bound to make afinal selection from the list.
This definition immediately distinguishes the nonpartisan merit"selection plan from
those jurisdictions which continue to use the strict appointive or elective systems. The
definition also excludes: "Commissions which confirm or review candidates submitted to it
by another governmental unit or individual." A. ASHMAN & J. ALFINI, supra note 1, at 12
(emphasis supplied).
37. E.g., A.A. CoNs?. amend. 83.
38. A. ASHMAN & J. ALFINI, supra note 1, at 35 (New York City).
39. ALA. CONsT. amend. 328, § 6.13; ALA. CONST. art. 4, § 8; D.C. CODE app. § 434
(1973 & Supp. V 1978); IND. CONST. art. 7, § 9; KAN. CONsT. art. 3, § 2; Mo. CoNsT. art. 5,
§ 25; NEB. CONsT. art. 5, § 21; NEv. CONsT. art. 6, § 20; Wyo. CONST. art. 5, § 4; Pa., A.
ASHMAN & J. ALFINI, supra note 1, at 36.
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(with lay persons in the majority)4° to an equality of lawyers and
lay persons a.4  Sometimes the exact proportion of lawyers to non-
lawyers has not been fixed 2.4  Lawyer members have sometimes
been elected by the bar membership,43 been appointed by the bar
leadership,' or coincided with the bar leadership.45 Judges have
been members,46 but not always.47  Legislators have sometimes
been members48 or have selected members.49 Sometimes there
has been a limitation on the number of commissioners from any
one political party,50 but not always.5'
40. ARIZ. CONST. art. 6, § 36; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 43.29 (West 1974); Ky. CONST.
§ 118; OKLA. CONST. art. 7-B, § 3; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 601 (Supp. 1979).
41. COLO. CONST. art. 6, § 24 (including a nonvoting judge); Ga., A. ASHMAN & J.
ALFINI, .rupra note 1, at 29.
42. IOWA CONST. art. 5, § 16; N.Y. CONST. art. 6, § 2; TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-4-102
(1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20-1-7.3 (Supp. 1979); Md., A. ASHMAN & J. ALFINI, supra
note I, at 32.
43. ALA. CONST. amend. 83, IND. CONST. art. 7, § 9; IOWA CONST. art. 5, § 16; KAN.
CONST. art. 3, § 2; KY. CONST. § 118; MO. CONST. art. 5, § 25; NEB. CONST. art. 5, § 21;
OKLA. CONST. art. 7-B, § 3; TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-4-102 (1980); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 20-1-7.3 (Supp. 1979); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 601 (Supp. 1979); Wyo. CONST. art. 5, § 4;
Md., A. ASHMAN & J. ALFINI, supra note 1, at 32.
44. ALAS. CONST. art. 4, § 8; ARIZ. CONST. art. 6, § 36 (the bar leadership actually
nominates, and the governor appoints by and with the advice and consent of the Senate);
D.C. CODE app. § 434 (1973 & Supp. V 1978); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 43.29 (West 1974);
IDAHO CODE § 1-2101 (1979); KAN. CONST. art. 3, § 2; NEV. CONsT. art. 6, § 20.
45. Ga., A. ASHMAN & J. ALFINI, supra note 1, at 29. Lawyers are selected in several
other ways. In Colorado, for example, lawyers are selected by the majority vote of the
governor, attorney general, and the chief justice of the State Supreme Court. COLO.
CONST. art. 6, § 24. In Montana, the lawyer members are appointed by the State Supreme
Court. MONT. CODE ANN. § 3-1-1001 (1978). In New York, the governor appoints two of
the lawyer members; two additional lawyer members are appointed by the chief judge of
the Court of Appeals. N.Y. CONST. art. 6, § 2.
46. ALA. CONST. amend. 83; ALAS. CONST. art. 4, § 8; ARIZ. CONST. art. 6, § 36; COLO.
CONST. art. 6, § 24 (nonvoting); D.C. CODE app. § 434 (1973 & Supp. V 1978); IDAHO
CODE § 1-2101 (1979); IND. CONST. art. 7, § 9; IOWA CONST. art. 5, § 16; Ky. CONST. § 118;
MO. CONsT. art. 5, § 25; MONT. CODE ANN. § 3-1-1001 (1978); NEB. CONST. art. 6, § 20;
UTAH CODE ANN. § 20-1-7.3 (Supp. 1979); WYO. CONST. art. 5, § 4; Pa., A. ASHMAN & J.
ALFINI, supra note 1, at 36.
47. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 43.29 (West 1974); OKLA. CONST. art. 7-B, § 3; TENN. CODE
ANN. § 17-4-102 (1980); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 601 (Supp. 1979); Ga., A. ASHMAN & J.
ALFINI, supra note 1, at 29; KAN. CONST. art. 3, § 2; Md., A. ASHMAN & J. ALFINI, supra
note I, at 32.
48. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 601 (Supp. 1979).
49. ALA. CONsT. amend. 83; N.Y. CONST. art. 6, § 2 (each of the following legislators
selects one commissioner: speaker of the assembly, temporary president of the senate, mi-
nority leader of the senate, and minority leader of the assembly); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 20-1-7.3 (Supp. 1979).
50. E.g., COLO. CONST. art. 6, § 24.
51. E.g., ALA. CONST. amend. 83.
In light of the varied composition of the judicial nominating commission, it is a mistake
to assume that all "merit" selection plans are alike or will operate identically. Neverthe-
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II. GOALS OF SELECTION
A. Quality
The lay person might assume a goal of judicial selection is to
select "the best" people for judgeships." This assumption, how-
ever, is not universally accepted; no consensus exists as to which
qualities make an individual "the best" candidate for a judgeship.
The conventional wisdom deems important the personal attributes
of honesty, moral courage, diligence, courtesy, patience, decisive-
ness, independence, impartiality, open-mindedness, knowledge of
the law, and experience.53 Even if the conventional wisdom is ac-
cepted, however, problems remain.
One unresolved problem is how much "knowledge of the law"
a candidate should possess. Although some knowledge is desira-
ble, a person who has specialized in one particular area-for ex-
ample, corporate law-may be considered for a trial court
judgeship which requires knowledge outside of that specialty.
The solution to this problem may be found, not in any automatic
disqualification of persons with a narrow specialty, but in a re-
quired course of instruction for newly appointed judges.54
Another question is whether candidates should be required to
have trial experience. Although this problem raises issues which
less, that assumption occasionally has been made. An example of a failure to differentiate
among various systems of merit selection and to distinguish between merit selection and
nonpartisan selection is found in an editorial of the Wall Street Journal. Wall St. J., Aug.
5, 1977, at 14, col. 1. (Editorial).
52. Eg., "Since we all want judges of high quality, the obvious thing to do is to pick
them for their proven and potential capacities." Rosenburg, Improving Selection of Judges
on Merit, 56 JUDICATURE 240, 240 (1973).
53. There are, of course, numerous ways in which to list desirable characteristics of a
judge. See, eg., A. ASHMAN & J. ALFINI, supra note 1, at 232-33; Rosenberg, The Qualities
of Justices-4re They Strainable?, 44 TEX. L. REv. 1063, 1066-67 (1966).
54. For a review of both mandatory and optional educational programs for state
judges, see B. FRANKLIN, NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, STATE JUDICIAL TRAIN-
ING PROFILE (1976). Orientation for new federal judges is provided by the Federal Judicial
Center. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, ANNUAL REPORT 1 (1979). Prior to certification as
military judges, army officers tentatively selected for that position attend a mandatory
three-week course at the Judge Advocate General's School, Charlottesville, Virginia.
The Ecole Nationale de la Magistrature (the French school for judges in Bordeaux)
may be a useful model for instruction of newly appointed judges. Before being assigned to
judicial positions, those with a law degree in France must first attend this school. Training
in legal subjects and the social sciences is provided at the Ecole itself, internships with
courts and other law-related agencies are provided during a period of about 24 months.
See generally G. VERPRAET, LE JUGE--CET INCONNU (1975); [BULLETIN OF THE] ECOLE
NATIONALE DE LA MAGISTRATURE (1975).
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may be more pertinent to a discussion of judicial careers, 55 two
observations should be made as to judicial selection. First, it has
been recognized generally that trial experience is less pertinent to
the work of appellate courts than to the work of trial courts and
that, therefore, the absence of such experience should not preclude
consideration of a person for the appellate bench. 6 Second, ex-
tensive trial experience may not be as essential for trial judges if a
school for judges can provide appropriate training, either prior to
selection or prior to a judge's assumption of his or her duties.57
Surprisingly enough, great competence, presumably the result
of high intelligence and fine training, is not invariably mentioned
as an essential judicial attribute, as is illustrated by the nomina-
tion of G. Harrold Carswell for the position of associate justice of
the Supreme Court. While considering the nomination in 1970,
the U.S. Senate heard testimony that Carswell was not the most
competent person for the job. 8 Senator Hruska remarked in an
interview, however, that "[e]ven if he [Carswell] were mediocre,
there are a lot of mediocre judges and people and lawyers, and
they are entitled to a little representation, aren't they?"59 There is
implicit support for Hruska's view in the writings of some social
scientists who suggest that there is an inconsistency between the
ideal of democracy and the desire to have the most intelligent peo-
ple in governmental positions. 60
55. See generally Davidow, Beyond Merit Selection: Judicial Careers Through Merit
Promotion, 12 TEx. TECH. L. REv. 851 (1981).
56. In one study, for example, the first 96 justices of the United States Supreme Court
were rated by 65 persons (law school deans and professors of law, history, and political
science). These ratings were correlated with occupational experience before selection to the
high court. The highest rating was given to academic lawyers; the next highest rating was
given to corporate lawyers, with lawyer/politicians ranking third. Walker & Hulbary, Se-
lection of Capable Justices, in A. BLAUSTEIN & R. MERsKY, THE FIRST ONE HUNDRED
JUSTICES 52, 65 (1978).
57. See note 54, supra.
58. Dean Louis H. Pollak of the Yale Law School, for example, testified that "I am
impelled to conclude that the nominee [Carswell] presents more slender credentials than
any nominee for the Supreme Court put forth in this century." George Harrold Carswell-
Hearings on the Nomination of George Harrold Carswell of florida to be ,4ssociate Justice of
the Supreme Court of the United States Before the Senate Comm on the Judiciary, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 242 (1970). The ABA Committee evaluating federal judges rated Carswell
as merely "qualified," rather than "well qualified" or "exceptionally well qualified." See S.
REP. No. 91-14, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1970).
59. N.Y. Times, March 17, 1970, at 21, col. 1.
60. Milton Rokeach, for example, devised a questionnaire to measure dogmatism; one
indication of dogmatism was the "coexistence of contradictions within the belief system."
M. ROKEACH, THE OPEN AND CLOSED MIND 74 (1960). Agreement with the following
statements was said to indicate the coexistence of contradictions within the belief system:
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The Hruska thesis, however, should be rejected. Other things
being equal, the most intelligent people should be in government.
No inconsistency need exist between a theory of democracy-at
least a theory of representative democracy, as contrasted with a
theory of pure democracy, such as that illustrated by the Greek
city-state or the New England town meeting-and a preference
for the most intelligent representative. 61 This author has person-
ally observed judges who were apparently unable to comprehend
the arguments of counsel. Many other lawyers and even non-law-
yers seemingly have had the same experience. 62 Neither the actu-
ality nor appearance of justice is served by such incompetence.63
B. Representativeness
Acceptance of quality as a legitimate goal of judicial selection,
leaves unanswered the question whether judges should be repre-
sentative of the community in which they serve or accountable to
that community. Here, a distinction should be drawn between
"accountability" and "representativeness." Some people have as-
sumed that because judges make policy decisions in deciding
cases-e.g., the abortion and reapportionment decisions of the
"The highest form of government is a democracy and the highest form of democracy is a
government run by those who are most intelligent" Id.
61. If there were a return to a pure democracy, as represented, for example, by the
Athenian city-state of the fourth and fifth centuries B.C. (see, e.g., 4 G. GROTE, supra note
10), or the New England town meeting, the conclusion might be reached that it would be
inconsistent with the notion of democracy to seek only intelligent rulers, since by definition
democracy involved rule by everyone. Since it seems likely, however, that a representative
democracy will continue, some individuals must be chosen to represent the rest. There is
certainly nothing in logic to prevent the conclusion that the most intelligent should be
selected as the representatives.
62. One nonlawyer who interviewed and observed judges across the country, albeit in
an unsystematic fashion, concluded:
My impression is that between 30 and 40 percent of state trial court judges are
unfit to sit. On the federal trial bench, I would estimate the figure to be about 10
percent. At the magistrates level, perhaps two thirds are unqualified for the re-
sponsibilities they hold. Their failures include intellectual inadequacy, corrup-
tion, bigotry, tyranny, tempermental instability, and physical or mental
disabilities.
D. JACKSON, JUDGES 379 (1974). At least partially consistent with this view is that of
Harold Chase, who has estimated that about ten percent of federal judges are "incapable of
doing a first-rate job"; Chase, however, attributes this inability to old age and illness rather
than to the selection process. H. CHASE, supra note 1, at 189.
63. If law is the "enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules,"
L. FULLER, THE MORALrrY OF LAW 96 (rev. ed. 1969), then it seems unlikely that the
enterprise will be furthered by the lack of respect for the courts that must inevitably flow
from a general perception that judges are not intellectually competent to perform their
duties.
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Supreme Court-judges should be accountable, in apparently the
same way that legislators are thought to be accountable.' This
legislative analogy should be rejected, however, because it as-
sumes that the task of the judge is no different from that 'of the
legislator." As more fully developed below, the jury analogy,
suggesting that the second major goal of judicial selection is repre-
sentativeness and not accountability, is more appropriate than the
legislative analogy.66
1. Differences Between Judges and Legislators
There are at least two respects in which the role of the judge in
the United States differs from that of the legislator. First, al-
though legislators theoretically are bound to uphold the Constitu-
tion,67 as a practical matter, the courts have assumed the task of
assuring compliance with the fundamental law.68 Thus, the role
of the court is not to ascertain the will of the majority; instead, it
often involves enforcing the provisions of the Bill of Rights
and other constitutional limitations in the face of majoritarian
opposition.69
Although constitutional issues may arise more frequently in
federal courts than in state courts, almost any mundane state court
adjudication can involve federal constitutional issues. In particu-
64. "Since judges make policy, it follows that, like other policymakers, they should be
accountable to the people in a representative political system. Nopersuasive reason has
been advanced for insulating state judges from accountability." Adamany & Dubois, Elect-
ing State Judges, 1976 Wis. L. REv. 731, 772.
65. See, e.g., H. Hart & A. Sacks, The Legal Process (unpublished ed. 1958).
66. See notes 78-86 infra and accompanying text.
67. "The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the
several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of United States and
of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitu-
tion. ... U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 3.
68. See, e.g., Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821) (Supreme Court has
constitutional authority to review state criminal judgments); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137 (1803) (Supreme Court has the constitutional authority to review laws enacted
by Congress).
69. A classic statement of this principle is found in Mr. Justice Jackson's opinion for
the court in West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnett, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), in which the
Supreme Court invalidated a compulsory flag salute on the basis of the first and fourteenth
amendments:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the
vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities
and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the court.
One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of
worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to
vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.
Id. at 638.
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lar, state criminal trials are subject to a myriad of federal constitu-
tional limitations developed through recent decisions of the
Supreme Court.70 Also, civil matters adjudicated in state
courts-for example, a suit to enforce a restrictive covenant in a
deed,7 ' a suit for the wrongful death of a mother brought by her
illegitimate children,72 and garnishment proceedings-often raise
federal constitutional issues.73
In fact, almost any state cause of action is potentially subject to
a due process or equal protection challenge. Thus, although many
cases tried in state courts do not raise constitutional issues, the
potential for constitutional assault is sufficiently great to justify
the assumption that such issues will arise regularly. Even if no
other factors were involved, this need to enforce limits on majority
rule would be sufficient to justify a system of judicial selection
different from that used to select legislators. The value judgment
implicit in this conclusion, should be made explicit: Our Consti-
tution strikes a balance between majority rule and the protection
of individual rights; the latter is as important as the former, and
the courts are the preeminent guarantors of the latter.74
Second, the role of judges in a complex society is inherently
different from that of legislators. In general, the legislature adopts
general principles to be applied prospectively, but the courts apply
general principles, previously determined, to existing disputes.
The significance of this distinction as to accountability is readily
apparent. When legislators, acting prospectively, attempt to deter-
70. E.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (application of sixth amendment
right to jury trial to states); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (requirement that a
suspect be informed of his or her privilege against self-incrimination before any of that
suspect's statements may be used against him or her in a judicial proceeding); Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (requirement that states provide indigents free counsel in
serious criminal cases); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (exclusion of evidence seized in
violation of fourth and fourteenth amendments).
71. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
72. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
73. North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
74. Thus, there are grounds for disagreeing with the proposition articulated by Justice
Rehnquist in his dissent in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972):
But an error in mistakenly sustaining the constitutionality of a particular enact-
ment, while wrongfully depriving the individual of a right secured to him by the
Constitution, nonetheless does so by simply letting stand a duly enacted law of a
democratically chosen legislative body. The error resulting from a mistaken up-
holding of an individual's constitutional claim against the validity of a legislative
enactment is a good deal more serious. For the result in such a case is not to leave
standing a law duly enacted by a representative assembly, but to impose upon the
Nation the judicial fiat of a majority of a court of judges whose connection with
the popular will is remote at best.
Id. at 468.
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mine present popular attitudes or anticipate future ones to ensure
their re-election, no threat is posed to the reasonable expectations
of private persons. There can be no detrimental reliance, there-
fore, when the statute has completely prospective effect. Ifjudges,
however, decide cases in accordance with their best estimate of
present or future popular attitudes, private parties' reasonable re-
liance on past precedents may not be protected.
The preceding discussion of the inherent differences between
the role of judge and legislator is, of course, oversimplified.
Sometimes retroactive curative laws are necessary; 76 sometimes it
is difficult to characterize a statute as prospective or retrospective,
as illustrated by changes in tax laws which only require future
action by the taxpayer but which are based on past events.77 Fur-
thermore, the courts occasionally rely on "legislative facts" to an-
nounce general principles designed to have largely prospective
effects.78  Nevertheless, an infrequent overlapping of function
should not obscure the reality that in most instances judges and
legislators perform different tasks. Thus, application of the notion
of accountability to judges-to the extent that such notion implies
popular election of judges--carries with it a potential for injustice
to private litigants.
75. See L. FULLER, supra note 63.
It is also commonly assumed that legislators make more policy than judges. This as-
sumption restates the second point-that judges are supposed to apply pre-existing princi-
ples, rather than create the principles themselves. As suggested below, however, this
difference is one of degree. See note 78 infra and accompanying text.
76. Fuller gives the following example:
Suppose a statute declares that after its effective date no marriage shall be valid
unless a special stamp, provided by the state, is affixed to the marriage certificate
by the person performing the ceremony. A breakdown of the state printing office
results in the stamps not being available when the statute goes into effect.
Though the statute is duly promulgated, it is little publicized, and the method by
which it would ordinarily become known, by word of mouth among those who
perform marriages, fails because the stamps are not distributed. Many marriages
take place between persons who know nothing of the law, and often before a
minister who also knows nothing of it. This occurs after the legislature has ad-
journed. When it is called back into session, the legislature enacts a statute con-
ferring validity on marriages which by the terms of the previous statute were
declared void. Though taken by itself, the retrospective effect of the second stat-
ute impairs the principle of legality, it alleviates the effect of a previous failure to
realize two other desiderata of legality: that the laws should be made known to
those affected by them and that they should be capable of being obeyed.
L. FULLER, supra note 63, at 53-54.
77. Id. at 59.
78. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), is a prime example of a judicial decision
applied prospectively.
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2. The Nature of Representativeness and the Jury Analogy
The notion of representativeness is consistent with the proper
role of the judiciary.79 Individual judges fulfill this representative
function if their policy views, presumably influenced by their
backgrounds,80 broadly represent the policy views of the popula-
tion or a pertinent subgroup of the population, such as all lawyers
eligible for judgeships. 1 An analogy to the jury system in crimi-
nal cases can best illustrate the pertinence of such representative-
ness; juries in these cases must reflect a cross-section of the
community.8 2 Jurors are not expected to conduct a public opinion
poll before deciding a case; instead the expectation is that their
beliefs, attitudes, and values-which are assumed to influence
their decisions-will reflect the beliefs, attitudes, and values of
adults in the wider community.83
The justification for requiring representativeness resembles the
justification for democracy: society may not always approve of
the results, but no better alternative exists."4 There is no consen-
sus on many fundamental legal and institutional issues, such as
79. See, ag., S. NAGEL, THE LEGAL PROCESS FROM A BEHAVIORAL PERSPECTIVE
(1969), who states: "In addition, if one finds that as background characteristics, like party
affiliation, religion, and regionalism, have a significant relation to certain judicial propensi-
ties, then one can better demonstrate the need for making judges more representative of the
people over whom they judge with regard to these characteristics." Id. at 177; Crockett,
Judicial Selection and the Black Experience, 58 JUDICATURE 438 (1975):
Among the criteria generally (and properly) applied to judicial candidates-in
addition to the hope for at least a modicum of understanding of the law, a breath
of compassion, a spark of originality-is the need for judges to represent a true
cross-section of the population over which they are to preside.
Id. at 438.
80. See notes 204-05 infra and accompanying text.
81. See notes 158-59 infra and accompanying text.
82. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
83. The argument might be made that this proposal for representativeness is inconsis-
tent with the criticism of Senator Hruska's view that mediocrities ought to be represented
on the Supreme Court. See note 61 supra and accompanying text. The distinction between
representativeness as to views and representativeness as to abilities is a legitimate one with
regard to judges, although it may not be a legitimate one with regard to jurors. If one has a
true cross section of the community on a jury, the jury, it is hoped, will include some
people who are intelligent, as well as some who are not; the more intelligent members will
be able to help those who are less intelligent. Since under our system of jurisprudence,
however, a judge very often sits alone, it is important that the judge be sufficiently intelli-
gent to understand, among other things, the arguments of counsel.
84. Consider Churchill's view of democracy: "It has been said that Democracy is the
worst form of government except all those other forms that have been tried from time to
time." Speech of Winston Churchill, House of Commons, November 1947, reprinted in
INTERNATIONAL THESAURUS OF QUOTATIONS (1970).
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the appropriate balance between order and liberty85 and the ex-
tent to which judges should be activists or champions of self-re-
straint.8 6 Thus, a system of judicial selection that would permit
selection of judges having only the viewpoint of the majority of
society would result in courts composed of judges having views
which are an anathema to some members of the minority. The
minority undoubtedly would prefer a process assuring selection of
at least some judges embracing the minority's viewpoint, to a sys-
tem making it highly unlikely that such judges would ever be
selected.87
C. Nonpartisansho
It is often assumed that nonpartisanship is also a goal of judi-
cial selection.88 Nonpartisanship, however, is not a primary goal,
85. Many of the specific issues involving the proper balance between order and liberty
have both substantive and procedural aspects. The question, for example, whether it is
constitutional for the state to place on a defendant in a criminal case the burden of proving
provocation to reduce a charge of murder to manslaughter, is substantive in the sense that
the state which places such a burden on the defendant is placed in a position of greater
power vis-a-vis individuals in society; but, the issue is procedural in the sense that it affects
the conduct of the trial and the extent to which certain evidence must be produced by the
defendant. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977). Similarly, the question
whether it is unconstitutional for a police officer to interrogate a formally charged defend-
ant in the absence of previously retained private counsel, has both substantive and proce-
dural aspects. The issue is substantive in the sense that it directly affects the relationship of
the individual to the government; it is procedural in the sense that if the action of the police
is unconstitutional, the statement taken during the interrogation may be included at trial.
See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
86. Even acknowledged champions of self-restraint, such as Justices Holmes and
Frankfurter, did not always vote to sustain state action in the face of constitutional chal-
lenge. E.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.); Gitlow v. New
York, 268 U.S. 652, 672 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting). In light of these opinions, it is not
so surprising that more recent self-styled champions of self-restraint, such as the four
Nixon appointees-Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Powell, and Rehn-
quist-have voted to invalidate state action on constitutional grounds. See, e.g., Allied
Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978); United States Trust Co. v. New
Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Although a certain amount of
activism seems inevitable, there is still a lively debate regarding the appropriate extent of
such activity. See, e.g., R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977). Moreover, "ac-
tivism" is not necessarily a single entity. For a discussion of the complexity of the concept
of activism in the context of trial courts, see Galanter, Palen & Thomas, The Crusading
Judge.- JudicialAtivism in Trial Courts, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 699 (1979).
87. Cf. J. RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 18-19 (1971) (determination of those princi-
ples that will be acceptable to people in advance of their knowing the particular circum-
stances in which they may find themselves).
88. The resolution, for example, presented to the American Bar Association in 1937,
advocating what has now become known as the system of merit selection, included a state-
ment of the desirability of adopting a method of selection that "will take the state judges
out of politics as nearly as may be." 23 A.B.A. J. 105 (1937).
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but one that is pursued, if at all, only because its achievement is
necessary to the accomplishment of another goal, such as quality.
Quality cannot be achieved if the ony or primary criterion of se-
lection is party service or loyalty.8 9 Similarly, if one party is in the
majority, but there are other parties or factions, selection on the
basis of party affiliation is not likely to lead to appropriate
representativeness.90
III. CRITIQUE OF PRESENT METHODS OF JUDICIAL SELECTION
IN THE UNITED STATES IN LIGHT OF THE GOALS OF
QUALITY AND REPRESENTATIVENESS
A. Election
A system of election, either partisan or nonpartisan, could pro-
vide the electorate with information concerning competence and
other pertinent attributes of judicial candidates. A screening com-
mittee, for example, designed to evaluate judicial candidates,
might publicize information about such candidates. 1 An amend-
ment to the American Bar Association Code of Judicial Conduct
probably would be required, however, if the screening committee
wanted to publicize the political views of such candidates. 2 To
date, evaluations of judicial candidates, apart from self-serving
89. "It seems to me empty to argue over whether partisan politics is a high road or a
low road to the bench. The fact is that under a partisan system, elective or appointive,
politics becomes virtually the only road to the bench. That is wrong." Rosenberg, Improv-
ing Selection of Judges on Merit, 56 JUDICATURE 240, 243 (1973).
90. On the basis of past experience, it seems unrealistic to expect that an appointing
authority from one party will, to any great extent, appoint judgis from other parties or
factions. From 1933 to 1962, for example, the percentage of federal judges (including jus-
tices of the United States Supreme Court) chosen from the same party as that of the presi-
dent ranged from 75% (in the case of Truman in regard to Supreme Court justices) to 100%
(in the case of Kennedy in regard to Supreme Court justices and judges of the courts of
appeals). J. GRossMAN, supra note 1, at 33. Similarly, in a recent preliminary study of
candidates selected by merit selection commissions under President Jimmy Carter's volun-
tary merit selection system for judges of the United States Court of Appeals, it was found
that during the first round of selection 85% of the candidates were Democrats; in the second
round 75% were Democrats. Berkson, Carbon & Neff, supra note 1, at 113.
91. Kaminsky, A Proposal for Mandatory Preselection Screening for State Court
Judges, 51 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 516 (1977); Curtiss, Screening Judicial Candidatesfor Elec-
tion, 59 JUDICATURE 320 (1976).
92. The pertinent provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct provide:
A candidate, including an incumbent judge, for ajudicial office that is filled either
by public election between competing candidates or on the basis of a merit system
election: . . . should not make pledges or promises of conduct in office other than
the faithful and impartial performance of the duties of the office; announce his
views on disputed legal or political issues; or misrepresent his identify, qualifica-
tions, present position, or other fact.
Id. § 7B(l)(c).
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statements emanating from the candidates themselves, have come
largely from bar polls in some jurisdictions.93 The publication of
the results of such polls, however, occasionally has failed to assist,
or even has harmed, those judges highly rated in the polls. 94 In
some instances, the electorate has known little or nothing about
the candidates-sometimes not even their names. 95 Thus, a major
restructuring of the present systems of partisan and nonpartisan
election would be required before the electorate could be given
meaningful information on which to judge the relative quality of
the judicial candidates.
Even if the electorate could be given pertinent information
concerning the competence and attitudes of judicial candidates, it
is unlikely that a system of election could provide adequate repre-
sentativeness. If, for example, impecunious lawyers could obtain
public funds to support their election campaigns,96 wealthy candi-
dates still would have a marked advantage in light of Buckley v.
Valeo,7 since it is doubtful that candidates could be prevented
93. The Connecticut experience with a bar poll is recounted in Costas & Isler, The
CBA Judgeship Poll- A CriticalfReappraisal, 53 CONN. B.J. 8 (1979). Several reviews of bar
polls are found in J. GUTERMAN & E. MEIDINGER, IN THE OPINION OF THE BAR (1977); D.
MADDI, JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE POLLS (1977); C. PHILLIP, How BAR ASSOCIATIONS
EVALUATE SITTING JUDGES (1976).
94. Watson and Downing report that a judge who was rated at the bottom of a bar
poll in 1934 nevertheless was elected with the help of ward leaders in St. Louis. R. WAT-
SON & R. DOWNING, supra note I, at 10. A judge from the State of Washington has said:
"The publication of the results of polls of the bar as to the merits of judicial candidates
generally has not been a determinative factor in judicial elections in this state." Utter,
Selection and Retention-A Judge's Perspective, 48 WASH. L. REV. 839, 844 (1973).
The possibility of a negative effect of a bar poll is indicated by the following:
Then the rather unpopular image of the Texas Lawyer, disclosed in a Belden poll,
may be projected into the election. One judge interviewee said: 'I have seen good
men defeated by bar support;' another: 'In some cases the impact was negative
while in others there was no effect;' and still another: 'I have seen it defeat the
most qualified candidates.'
Henderson & Sinclair, supra note I, at 450.
95. Even though Democratic candidate Donald Yarbrough did poorly in the Texas
State bar poll in 1976, for example, he nevertheless won the election. A subsequent survey
in one medium size Texas city demonstrated substantial ignorance on the part of voters
regarding judicial candidates. See McKnight, Schaefer & Johnson, Choosing Judges.- Do
the Voters Know What They're Doing?, 62 JUDICATURE 94 (1978). An earlier survey re-
vealed similar ignorance on the part of voters in several areas in New York State. How
Much Do Voters Know or Care .4bout Judicial Candidates?, 38 J. AM. JUD. SoC'Y 141
(1955).
96. For a discussion of public financing of judicial elections, see Kaminsky, Available
Compromises For Continued Judicial Selection Reform, 53 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 466, 495-500
(1979).
97. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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constitutionally from spending their own money in a campaign. 98
A more fundamental problem of representativeness is the po-
tential for a dilution of minority voting strength. This problem
arises because the traditional form of election in the United States
requires a majority vote for victory. When voting is polarized
along racial lines-a common phenomenon today 99- a Black mi-
nority constituting fifteen percent of the population, for example,
could never hope to elect a Black candidate to judicial office.100
Better representativeness can be achieved, however, by filling
several judicial positions simultaneously."0 ' In some jurisdic-
tions-particularly rural ones-it is not feasible to use such a de-
vice unless several judges from a large area are elected
simultaneously. Such an increase in the size of the area, however,
may remove an advantage often claimed for elections in small
communities, i.e., that voters in rural areas "really know" the can-
98. In Buckley v. Valeo, the Court, inter alia, struck down spending limitations as
applied to candidates for public office. In so doing the Court stated in part:
The ancillary interest in equalizing the relative financial resources of candidates
competing for elective office, therefore, provides the sole relevant rationale for
[Federal Election Campaign act § 203, 18 U.S.C.] § 608(a)'s expenditure ceiling.
That interest is clearly not sufficient to justify the provision's infringement of fun-
damental First Amendment rights. First, the limitation may fail to promote
financial equality among candidates. A candidate who spends less of his personal
resources on his campaign may nonetheless outspend his rival as a result of more
successful fundraising efforts. Indeed, a candidate's personal wealth may impede
his efforts to persuade others that he needs their financial contributions or volun-
teer efforts to conduct an effective campaign. Second, and more fundamentally,
the First Amendment simply cannot tolerate § 608(a)'s restriction upon the free-
dom of a candidate to speak without legislative limits on behalf of his own candi-
dacy. We therefore hold that § 608(a)'s restriction on the candidate's personal
expenditures is unconstitutional.
424 U.S. at 54. Although it can be argued that judicial elections are, in a number of re-
spects, different from other elections, the rather strong language concerning the restrictive
impact of the first amendment suggests that the same rule might well apply to judicial
elections.
99. In Bolden v. City of Mobile, Alabama, 571 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'don other
grounds, 446 U.S. 55 (1980), a suit challenging a system of at-large elections for members
of the City Commission in Mobile. Alabama, the Court of Appeals noted the trial court
finding that "[n]o black had achieved election to the City Commission, due, in part, to
racially polarized voting of an acute nature." 571 F.2d at 243.
100. In Lubbock, Texas, for example, although Blacks and Chicanos make up almost
twenty-five percent of the population, no Black or Chicano has ever been elected a member
of the Lubbock City Council. Jones v. City of Lubbock, No. CA-5-76-34 (N.D. Tex.
1979), rev'd andrem'd, No. 79-2744 (5th Cir. March 25, 1981), reversal withdrawn (Apr. 29,
1981).
101. In an election with ten candidates for five positions, for example, the five candi-
dates with the most votes would fill the judicial positions. See, eg., MICH. STAT. ANN.
§ 6.1417 (1972).
1981]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [
didates because of close personal association."O2 Furthermore, it is
not clear that it is beneficial to fill vacancies simultaneously since
increasing the number of candidates increases the difficulties for
the electorate in choosing intelligently.10 3 In addition, the concern
for stability should counsel against the creation of the possibility
of a sudden, large-scale change in court personnel. 0 4
B. Executive Appointment
The problems associated with executive appointment, with or
without confirmation by a special or legislative body, have been
extensively treated in other commentaries. 10 5 For the purposes of
this Article, however, it is sufficient to note that since political con-
siderations are likely to be the sole or dominant consideration in
the appointment of judges, that executive appointment is unlikely
to ensure either quality or representativeness. Although a require-
ment of confirmation by a legislative or independent body may
give some protection against the appointment of grossly incompe-
tent judges, the history of senatorial confirmation, for example, is
not reassuring. 10 6 Even if such confirmation by an independent
102. See, e.g., Garwood, Judicial Revision-An Argumentfor the Merit Planfor Judicial
Selection and Tenure, 5 TEx. TECH. L. REV. 1, 13 (1973).
103. See KIots, The Selection of Judges andthe Short Ballot, 38 J. AM. JUD. Soc'y 134
(1955).
104. Fuller has referred to the principle that "laws should not be changed too fre-
quently," as one of the "principles that make up the internal morality of the law." L.
FULLER, supra note 63, at 79.
There are also other difficulties with a system of election ofjudges. For an incumbent
judge, there is the problem of time lost from the bench during re-election. See, e.g., Van
Osdol, Politics and Judicial Selection, 28 ALA. LAW. 167, 169 (1967). Moreover, in view of
the restraints presently imposed on subject matter in a judicial campaign, many lawyers
find the prospect of running for judicial office demeaning. See, e.g., Lindsay, The Selection
ofJudges, 21 REc. N.Y.C.B.A. 514, 517 (1966). In fact, it has been asserted that the present
costs ofjudicial election and its demeaning nature cause many able lawyers not to run for
judicial office. Kaminsky, Judicial Selection.- Alternatives to the Status Quo in the Selection
of State Court Judges, 48 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 496, 513 (1974). For an excellent account of
the practical reality of judicial campaigning by one who is eminently qualified for the of-
fice, see Waltz, supra note 1.
105. In regard to federal appointments by the United States President, see, e.g., J.
GROSSMAN, supra note 1.
106. Grossman reported in 1965 that from 1893 to that date only one Supreme Court
nominee had been rejected by the Senate. Id. at 168. Since then, three nominees have
failed to be confirmed: Fortas, Haynsworth, and Carswell. More precisely, Associate Jus-
tice Fortas withdrew his name from consideration (for the position of Chief Justice) under
pressure, N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1968, at I, col. 8, but it would seem that he was bowing to the
inevitable. The Senate officially rejected the other two candidates. N.Y. Times, Nov. 22,
1969, at 1, col. 6 (Haynsworth); N.Y. Times, April 9, 1970, at 1, col. 8 (Carswell). The
question remains whether the Senate has been a very effective check on the exercise of
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body provides a check on the appointment of incompetent judges,
the screening function performed by the senate or a similar body
provides no assurance of representativeness.1
0 7
C. Merit Selection
Some form of merit selection offers the best opportunity to
achieve the goals of quality and representativeness. 0 8 Surveys of
lawyers in Missouri'0 9 and Colorado,"0 for instance, indicate a
belief that the merit plan has increased the quality of judges in
these states. Although some political scientists have observed, for
presidential discretion. Only one of these nominees-Carswell-was rejected in part be-
cause of a lack of competence; in the case of the other two, the opposition was largely
political.
107. One admittedly very rough guide to representativeness is the appointment of per-
sons from a party other than that of the appointing authority. In the case of Supreme
Court Justices from 1933 to 1962, the percentage of appointments of those from the Presi-
dent's own party ranged from a low of 75% in the case of Truman to a high of 100% in the
case of Kennedy. GROSSMAN, supra note 1, at 28.
108. See A. ASHMAN & J. ALFINI, supra note 1.
109. Seventy-three percent of the Missouri lawyers responding to the survey indicated
their opinion that "the plan has recruited better judges." R. WATSON & R. DOWNING,
supra note 1, at 259.
110. Seventy-seven percent of all lawyers responding to the questionnaire in Colorado
indicated that the merit selection plan had "improved the quality of judges selected to the
bench" since implementation of the plan. A. ASHMAN & J. ALFINI, supra note 1, at Table
XVIII at 200.
One author has questioned these kinds of statistics, noting that Watson and Downing
admitted that there was a correlation between originally favoring the nonpartisan court
plan and finding judges selected under that plan to be of higher quality than those selected
by election. Glick, supra note 1, at 529-30. This criticism by Glick must be placed in
proper perspective by recalling that Watson and Downing also concluded that
Supporters of the elective system do not evaluate its judges higher than those
chosen under the Plan: their ratings of Plan and holdover judges in Jackson
County are virtually identical, as are their ratings of St. Louis City Plan and St.
Louis County elective judges, and they actually rate the St. Louis City Plan
judges as being considerably better than their holdover colleagues.
R. WATSON, & R. DOwNING, supra note 1, at 288.
Moreover, Glick totally ignores the findings of the Colorado survey, which show that
elected judges as well as judges appointed under the merit selection plan thought that the
plan had "improved the quality of judges selected to the bench" since implementation of
the plan. A. ASHMAN & J. ALFINI, supra note 1, at 198. Although a greater percentage of
appointed judges agreed with the proposition regarding improvement in the quality of
judges selected-95% for appointed judges as opposed to 77% for elected judges is still a
very substantial majority of the elected judges who agreed that the quality of judges had
been improved by the plan. Id.
In M. LEVIN, URBAN POLITICS AND THE CRIMINAL COURTS (1977), the author also
raises questions about whether merit selection leads to the selection of "better" judges.
Whatever else can be said about Levin's study, it offers no data with respect to this issue,
since the study involves a comparison of judges selected by popular election in Pittsburgh
with judges selected by nonpartisan election in Minneapolis-St. Paul; the study, therefore,
does not involve a merit selection plan. Id. at 48-59.
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example, that the judges selected under merit plans and elected
judges have attended law schools of comparable quality,"' this
observation does not prove that merit selection judges are inferior
to elected judges. Such an "objective" criterion as the quality of
the law school attended by the judge is not necessarily related to
present competence. 12
The main problem with present merit selection plans is their
failure to assure sufficient representativeness. Under the original
version of the merit selection plan, which was adopted in Mis-
souri, for example, three of the seven members of the judicial
nominating commission are appointed by the governor' 13 -the
chief politician in the state. Since the governor is usually elected
by majority vote and is likely to be committed to the views of his
or her constituency, virtually all of his or her appointments to the
commission will reflect such a majoritarian bias." 4 Even where
Il1. Glick, supra note 1, at 525.
112. Although certain prestigous national law schools usually get students who have
done better in undergraduate school and have demonstrated greater capacity for legal work
(as demonstrated on the Law School Admissions Test), these factors do not mean that all
graduates of less prestigous schools are inferior to all graduates of the prestigous schools.
Since, as indicated below at note 190, infra, there has been no demonstration of a correla-
tion between performance in law school and performance as a lawyer, it cannot be as-
sumed that performance in law school, which at least can be quantified, is an indication of
the quality of persons placed on the bench. It may be true that with recent graduates, there
is no clue to potential performance as a judge other than actual performance in law school;
however, some people develop more gradually than others, and certainly some very fine
judges have not had exemplary law school records.
For a discussion of the evaluation of judicial candidates, see notes 160-69, 213, 226,
232-35, & 239 infra & accompanying text.
113. MO. CONsT. art. 5, § 25.
114. Watson and Downing note:
Table 6.2 further shows that our general expectation regarding the lessening of
partisan factors in the selection of Plan judges, compared to elective judges, is not
borne out by the data. Since 1940, the minority Republican party has been less
well-represented on the Jackson County and St. Louis City circuit benches than it
was during the period when such judges were popularly elected. However, the
table fails to take into account important political developments that have oc-
curred in both these communities since the Plan was adopted in 1940. These two
cities have become overwhelmingly Democratic since that time, and if voting for
judges had paralleled voting for other offices, it is doubtful that few, if any, Re-
publican judges would have been elected to these benches under a system of par-
tisan ballots. Moreover, the St. Louis County situation indicates what has
happened in an elective jurisdiction that is not as clearly Democratic as the two
cities: Democratic representation on the County circuit bench rose rapidly in the
period since 1940 as a result of the growing strength of the party in that afea, as
well as the practice of Democratic governors of appointing fellow partisans to
new judgeships and vacancies on the court. Thus it is erroneous to assume that
the Plan has actually disadvantaged the minority Republican Party as far as rep-
resentation in the Jackson County and St. Louis circuit courts is concerned. At
the same time, it has not produced the party balance on the bench that some
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bipartisanship is required, as in Colorado, 1 5 only the two major
parties are guaranteed representation on the commission. The
various groups, however, that are particularly interested in, and
are likely to be affected by, the work of the courts 1 6 do not neces-
sarily arrange themselves along traditional party lines. Sympathy
or antipathy towards persons accused of crime, for example, is not
necessarily a function of party affiliation. 17 Thus, bipartisanship
on the commission provides no assurance of representativeness.
Furthermore, there is no guarantee that representativeness of the
commission as a whole will be improved by the presence of mem-
bers not appointed by the governor. Although Watson and
Downing concluded that the commissioners, especially lawyer
commissioners, in Missouri did represent the various interest
groups fairly well,I S there is no structural guarantee that non-ap-
pointed commissioners will represent the community at large or
groups especially interested in the courts.
Most other methods of commissioner selection offer no greater
assurance of representativeness. Legislative selection of the com-
missioners, whether the persons selected are themselves legisla-
tors,"19 is no guarantee of broad representation; once again, while
the majority party may be represented well, other groups may
not.120
The method of judicial selection following nomination by the
persons, perhaps mistakenly, associated with the nonpartisan emphasis of the
Plan.
R. WATSON & R. DOWNING, supra note 1, at 211-12 (footnotes omitted).
115. CoLo. CONST. art. 6, § 24.
116. Watson and Downing list, for example, a number of such interest groups: casualty
insurance companies, public utilities, railroads, social service organizations active in the
welfare field, and newspapers. R. WATSON & R. DOWNING, supra note 1, at 77-79. Wat-
son and Downing report that labor unions are not particularly interested in state judge-
ships; they are presumably more interested in federal judgeships, since federal courts do
review decisions of administrative agencies in the labor law field. Certainly, minority
groups, members of which form the majority of persons processed through the criminal
justice system, presumably have an interest in the workings of a court as well. Id. at 78,
173.
117. See note 205 infra.
118. R. WATSON & R. DOWNING, supra note 1, at 350-51.
119. In Utah, one commissioner is chosen by the state senate, and one commissioner is
chosen by the state house of representatives; apparently neither person selected need be a
member of the state legislature. In addition, the governor appoints two commissioners, and
the Utah State Bar Association appoints two commissioners. The Chief Justice of the State
Supreme Court is a commissioner ex officio. UTAH CODE ANN. § 20-1-7.3 (Supp. 1979).
In Vermont, the state senate and the state house each elect three of its members as commis-
sioners. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 601 (Supp. 1980).
120. Some awareness of the need for greater representativeness is shown in Montana,
where four nonlawyer members are appointed by the governor, "each of whom is represen-
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commission reveals a similar problem of representativeness. Even
if the commission always succeeds, despite its somewhat unrepre-
sentative composition, in nominating three or more persons who
represent a range of beliefs, attitudes, and values, 2' the chief ex-
ecutive may select the person with views most similar to his or her
own views. 122
IV. PROPOSALS FOR MODIFIED MERIT SELECTION
A. The Potentialfor Increased Representativeness Through Merit
Selection
The negative aspects of the assessment of the current merit se-
lection plans contained in the prior section should be placed in
proper perspective. Previous discussion mentioned surveys of
lawyers in Missouri and Colorado indicating the belief of many of
those lawyers that the quality of judges in those states has been
improved by merit selection.123 Moreover, the Colorado survey
evidenced a belief that merit selection encourages competent law-
yers to seek judgeships. 124 This latter point is especially relevant
to the potential for representativeness since persons with varying
backgrounds apparently are willing to submit their names to a ju-
dicial nominating commission.
This potential for representativeness is further illustrated by
this author's own survey of law student attitudes towards judicial
careers."'2  Advanced law students in a nationwide sample 126 were
asked, among other things, to indicate on a seven-point scale, the
likelihood that they would seek a judgeship under six separate
tative of a different industry, business, or profession." MONT. CODE ANN. § 3-1-1001
(1979).
121. To the extent that beliefs, attitudes, and values are a function of varying back-
grounds, see notes 204-05 infra and accompanying text, the effort to obtain representative
nominees will presumably result in the selection of those with representative backgrounds.
122. See R. WATSON & R. DOWNING, supra note 1, at 352.
President Carter has apparently followed the established tradition of appointing judges
from his own political party whose views are relatively close to his own. It has been re-
ported, for example, that as of April 1979, approximately eighty-six percent of President
Carter's appointments to the United States Court of Appeals consisted of Democrats. L.
BERKSON & S. CARBON, supra note 1, at 181.
123. See notes 109-10 supra and accompanying text.
124. Seventy-six percent of all lawyers responding to the survey indicated agreement
with the statement that the merit selection plan "encouraged competent lawyers to seek
judicial appointments." A. ASHMAN & J. ALFINI, supra note 1, at 200.
125. Davidow, Law Student Attitudes Towards Judicial Careers, (unpublished manu-
script version on file with author of article to be published in 50 U. Cin. L. Rev. 247
(1981)).
126. Questionnaires from 1,094 students from 19 law schools across the country were
included in the study. Id. at 5.
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methods or conditions of judicial selection: (1) selection by popu-
lar, partisan election; (2) selection by popular, nonpartisan elec-
tion; (3) selection by appointment by the chief executive, with or
without confirmation by the upper house of the legislature; (4) se-
lection by legislative appointment; (5) selection by appointment
based on "merit";127 and (6) selection by appointment to an infer-
ior court judgeship, with the selected judge having "a reasonable
assurance that he or she will be promoted to the court of general
jurisdiction and eventually to the appellate court if, without en-
gaging in political activity, he or she exhibits desirable judicial
attributes." 2
The law students surveyed were remarkably consistent in stat-
ing that they would be more likely to seek a judgeship with merit
selection than with any other method listed.'29 Students grouped,
for example, according to party, region, gender, and demonstrated
success in law school all indicated this preference. 30  Only non-
Caucasians departed from this pattern, 13' although they also
would be more likely to seek a judgeship with merit selection than
with any of the traditional methods, such as executive appoint-
ment, nonpartisan election, or partisan election. 32  In addition,
there is reason to believe that young lawyers share the preference
127. The following definition of merit selection was set forth in the questionnaire:
Judges are appointed by the chief executive from a list of three nominees com-
piled by a bi-partisan nominating commission, with the appointee remaining a
judge thereafter unless the voters at a subsequent election vote to remove him or
her from office. At such subsequent elections, held at regular intervals, the voters
can choose to retain or remove the judge, but they cannot vote for an opponent.
If the judge is voted out of office, a successor is chosen by the chiefjustice in the
manner prescribed for initial selection.
Id. at 3 (Appendix).
128. Id. at 9-10.
129. Id. at 20-25.
130. Specifically, the overall pattern obtains for students who were: Democrats,
Independents, Republicans, Caucasians, those totally opposed to capital punish-
ment, those usually opposed to capital punishment, those neutral towards capital
punishment, those usually in favor of capital punishment, those strongly in favor
of capital punishment, males, females, those enrolled in northern schools, those
enrolled in southern schools, those enrolled in border-state schools, those enrolled
in western schools, those attending law schools in states using merit selection,
those attending law schools in states not using merit selection, those who believe
that merit selection was used where they resided for a substantial period of time,
those who did not believe that merit selection was used where they resided for a
substantial period of time, those on law review, those not on law review, those
with high factor scores (judicial career, factor 6), those with medium factor scores,
and those with low factor scores.
Id. at 22-23.
131. Id. at 23. The result in regard to non-Caucasians must be treated cautiously be-
cause of the small number (63) of non-Caucasians responding. Id. at 24.
132. Id. at 23.
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for merit selection expressed by law students.133 The challenge,
therefore, is to capitalize on this potential for representativeness
through appropriate modifications of the Missouri plan that will
enhance representativeness, while continuing to assure the selec-
tion of competent judges.
B. Possible Modfcations of Merit Selection: The Usefulness of
Proportional Representation and Selection by Lot
Proportional representation and selection by lot are two com-
ponents of a system of judicial selection that are unfamiliar to
most Americans. These two procedures should be considered as
potential modifications of a system of merit selection, however,
because of the possible contribution they can make toward achiev-
ing the goals of quality and representativeness.
1. Proportional Representation in the Selection of at Least Some
Members of the Nominating Commission
Proportional representation is a device, used primarily in cer-
tain European elections, to ensure more accurate representa-
tion. '34 Such a device is a response to the problem, noted above,
that minorities in any given electorate are likely to remain unrep-
133. Because of a similarity in patterns between responses from law students at the
University of Houston and responses from young lawyers in Houston, the conclusion can
be reached cautiously that there is a good chance that the pattern for students would also
hold true for young lawyers. Id. at 28-30.
Other surveys of various populations regarding general attitudes toward merit selection
plans have yielded mixed results. Two state surveys of the general population have shown
negative attitudes toward merit selection plans. Note, Judicial Selection in the States: A
Critical Study With Proposal For Reform, 4 HOFSTRA L. REV. 267, 317 n.154 (1976)
(Minn.); Gordon, Judicial Reform, A Legislative Viewpoint, 48 N.Y. ST. B.J. 284, 285 (1976)
(New York State). A Survey of Pennsylvania legislators in the late 1950's also yielded
negative results. Keefe, Judges and Politics: The Pennsylvania Plan of Judge Selection, 20
U. PITT. L. REv. 621, 624-25 (1959). Other surveys, however, have shown a positive atti-
tude toward merit selection. Atkins, Judges' Perspective on Judicial Selection, 49 ST.
GOV'T. 180, 185 (1976) (Florida judges); Niles, supra note 1, at 248-49 (survey of nominat-
ing commissioners in Missouri, Iowa, Kansas, and Nebraska); Sheldon, Perceptions of the
Judicial Roles in Nevada, 1968 UTAH L. REV. 355, 367 (survey of judges). In a survey of
lawyers and judges in Texas, a majority of both groups favored the Missouri plan over
other methods considered individually. Lawyers, however, tended to favor some method
of election; that is, more Texas lawyers favored the present method of election and election
for longer terms than favored the "Missouri plan." Henderson & Sinclair, supra note I, at
497.
134. For general discussions of proportional representation, see, e.g., G. HALLETT & C.
HOAG, PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION (2d ed. 1940); E. LAKEMAN, How DEMOCRACIES
VOTE (4th ed. 1974).
Although proportional representation has been used more extensively in Europe, it has
been used in approximately 20 municipalities in the United States at one time or another.
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resented in a system of strict majority rule.13 Although different
types of proportional representation exist, the list system is the
simplest.1 36 Under that system, individuals vote for one of several
lists of candidates, each proposed by a particular party or faction.
Each party or faction is then entitled to the selection of the per-
centage of the total number of candidates to be elected that corre-
sponds to the percentage of votes cast for its list. If X party
receives ten percent of the popular vote, for example, and the
number of candidates to be selected is one hundred, then X party
is entitled to ten representatives, who are the first ten candidates
on the list originally proposed by X party. Thus, through a system
of proportional representation, even a small faction can be certain
of receiving some representation in a popularly elected body.
Another type of proportional representation is the single trans-
ferable vote. 37 This system does not require party organization;
instead, each voter lists the candidates in order of preference with
his or her second, third, and even lower choices often being used
to permit candidates to achieve the minimum number of votes
needed for selection. Greater flexibility is thereby achieved with
this system than with the list system.
The primary difficulty with proportional representation in the
legislative context is that, arguably, it can lead to undue factional-
ism since many parties may be represented. 138  Even if it is as-
sumed that this objection is valid, however, it is of less concern in
regard to the judiciary, where each judge is expected to act indi-
E. LAKEMAN, supra at 245. A general discussion of the early Cincinnati experience with
proportional representation is found in C. TAFr, CrrY MANAGEMENT 94-105 (1933).
135. Although the United States Supreme Court has held that the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment incorporates the 1980 principle of "one person, one
vote" in regard to systems of election, it recently rejected the notion that such provision
incorporates a principle of proportional representation. The Court established its position
in a suit in which Black plaintiffs argued that a system of at-large municipal elections
prevented them from electing a candidate of their own choosing. City of Mobile, Alabama
v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 75-76.
136. See E. LAKEMAN, supra note 134, at 92-110.
137. Id. at 111-50.
138. See, e.g., F. HERMENS, DEMOCRACY OR ANARCHY? (1972).
It should not be assumed that under proportional representation, ballots are necessarily
long and confusing. But ree text accompanying note 102 s.pra. The ballot need not be an
unintelligible one under the list system; the total number of names on the ballot may be
great, but the number of parties will be considerably smaller, and the positions of the vari-
ous parties are more important than the specific names on the ballot Second, even under
the single transferable vote, although the number of candidates may be relatively large,
voter apathy, particularly among minorities, is likely to be less because of the greater likeli-
hood of selection of minority candidates. Less apathetic voters are likely to be better in-
formed about candidates attractive to them.
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vidually and not as a member of a party. If pertinent at all in the
judicial context, party affiliation is only one possible indicator of
attitudes that may influence a judge's decisionmaking process.
If proportional representation were used to select at least some
members of a judicial nominating commission, "politics" would
not be eliminated; in fact, the whole purpose of using proportional
representation would be to ensure the presence of politics--but a
more broadly representative politics than is possible under a sys-
tem of strict majoritarianism.
The quality of judicial nominees would not suffer merely be-
cause of the presence of politics in the selection of members of the
nominating commission. As developed more fully below,'39 the
more broadly representative nature of the commission would pre-
vent any one faction from selecting its own "party hack" because
other factions could oppose any such effort.
2. Selection of Judges by Lot From Among Those Nominated by
the Commission
Another suggestion for achieving greater representativeness is
selection of judges by lot after nomination by the commission.
Reference has already been made to the lack of consensus on
some fundamental public policy issues."4 Attitudes toward these
issues, such as abortion and legislative apportionment, are likely
to affect judicial fact-finding and choice of an appropriate legal
standard. 4 ' It is precisely in situations in which there is such dis-
agreement that selection by lot is appropriate because it allows
society to avoid making choices. As one commentator has stated:
[W]hen the policies to be furthered are in conflict or the good
cannot be allocated rationally, the luck of the draw avoids the
difficult choice between people. The premise is that people are
better able to accept and reconcile themselves to certain kinds
of decisions when made by fate, rather than through the appli-
cation of principles they dislike or of limited human reason. 142
If the argument in favor of assuring representativeness with
regard to beliefs, attitudes, and values is accepted, then it is not
139. See text following note 156 infra.
140. See notes 85-86 supra and accompanying text.
141. The concept of "selective perception" is well recognized in psychology. See Has-
torf & Cantril, They Saw a Game: A Case Study, 49 J. ABNORMAL AND SOC. PSYCH. 129
(1954); Vidmar & Rokeach, Archie Bunker's Bigotry. A Study in Selective Perception and
Exposure, 24 J. COMM. 36 (1974).
142. Note, The Equality 0/Allocation by Lot, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 113, 123
(1977).
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difficult to accept selection by lot, which in this context is merely a
mechanism that achieves more accurate representation.143 If
nominees are relatively numerous and appropriately representa-
tive on every occasion, the law of averages will assure representa-
tive selection over time. This process may be illustrated as
follows: If the number of nominees is twelve on each occasion,
the chance that any one nominee will be chosen by lot on any
occasion is one-twelfth or approximately 8.3%. If the same nomi-
nee (or one possessing similar beliefs, attitudes, and values) is in-
volved in ten consecutive selections, the probability of selection
increases to 58%.144
The question arises, however, whether selection by lot is con-
sistent with affirmative action policies designed to overcome the
effects of historic discrimination against minorities and women in
the legal profession. 145 It may be argued that, other things being
equal, selection by lot is appropriate to secure representativeness,
but not where other things have not been equal.
The affirmative action problem requires a two-part response.
First, even if the proposals in this Article are favorably received,
they are not likely to be implemented immediately. Thus, the af-
firmative action programs which exist under present methods of
judicial selection can continue. Second, it is within the power of
the commission to increase the number of minorities among the
nominees under a system of selection by lot. If the commission,
for example, chooses two minority nominees on each occasion, in-
stead of one, the chance that a minority member will be selected
by lot is increased from one-twelfth to one-sixth on each of those
occasions; there is now a 59.9% chance that a minority nominee
will be selected in the course of five consecutive selections by
143. The use of the lot in judicial selection was first suggested to the author by James
Renfrew, Esquire, of Royal Oak, Michigan in the fall of 1974. Renfrew viewed selection
by lot as selecting from among all attorneys in a particular jurisdiction for a nonrenewable
term of four years. Two recent proposals, though differing in crucial respects from the
proposal set forth infra, have included a recommendation that the lottery be used in some
fashion in the selection ofjudges. T. BECKER, AMERICAN GOVERNMENT. PAST, PRESENT,
FUTURE 486 (1976); Mullen & Clancy, The McCourt Bill- .4 Practical Merit Selection Plan,
66 ILL. BJ. 12 (1977).
144. The formula for computing the probability is 1-(11/12)x where x equals the
number of selections.
145. Arguably, President Carter did a good job in increasing the number of minority
persons on the United States Courts of Appeals. It recently has been reported, for example,
that twenty-nine percent of his appointments have been from among minorities. L. BERK-
SON & S. CARBON, supra note 1, at 181.
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lot." Moreover, in large cities, such as Detroit, in which Blacks
are in the majority, proportional representation presumably will
result in the selection of a large number of Black commissioners,
who may be expected to select a large number of Black nomi-
nees. 147 Use of the lot in such circumstances is thus likely to result
in the selection of a large number of Black judges.
Similarly, if a vacancy on a court is created by the death or
retirement of a judge with a particular expertise, selection by lot
will not preclude the selection of a new judge with a similar exper-
tise if the commissioners agree that there is a continued need for
such expertise on the court. Even if there is disagreement about
this need or if fewer than twelve sufficiently qualified candidates
with this expertise can be found, the chance that a person with
such expertise will be selected will still exist. Selection by lot will
thus be no worse in this regard than systems of appointment and
election. Under a system of appointment, a chief executive may
select someone with a particular expertise, but no guarantees exist.
Other factors, such as the perceived need to reward a political sup-
porter, may outweigh the need for someone with such an exper-
tise. Furthermore, under an elective system, the selection of a
judge with a particular expertise to replace a judge with the same
expertise can be no more than fortuitous.
History reinforces the arguments for the use of random selec-
tion; selection by lot 4 ' was used in the fourth and fifth centuries
146. The formula for computing the probability is now 1-(5/6)X where x equals the
number of selections; the chance that at least one minority member will be selected in the
course of ten selections is now 83.9%.
147. At least one prominent Black has opposed merit selection on the ground that in
Detroit, election has been responsible for the selection of many Blacks and that adoption of
a system of merit selection is likely to decrease the number of Blacks thus chosen. See
Crockett, supra note 79, at 438.
148. For a general discussion of the theory of selection by lot, see Note, supra note 142.
Two modem examples of use of the lot are the military lottery (50 U.S.C. § 455 (1976) (not
presently being utilized, but still on the statute books)) and, perhaps more pertinently, jury
selection (e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1863 (1976)). In addition to selection ofjudicial and other of-
ficers by lot in ancient Greece, see note 146 infra, historical examples of the lot or lottery
include the use of random selection to determine which of a number of passengers on a
boat or ship are to survive in an emergency situation in which it is evident that not every-
one can survive. United States v. Holmes, 26 F. Cas. 360, 367 (C.C.E.D. Pa. (1842) (No.
15,383) (charge to jury). The religious origins of selection by lot are illustrated by the case
of Jonah, who was thrown overboard by a storm when it was determined by lot that it was
he who was the source of God's wrath. Jonah 1:7-15.
For proposals for additional use of the lottery, see DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312,
344 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (selection of candidates for admission to law schools);
Divine, Women in the Academy: Sex Discrimination in University Faculty Hiring and Pro-
motion, 5 J.L. & EDuC. 429, 434-44 (1976) (use of lot in hiring and promotion in university
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B.C. in Athens for the selection of most governmental officials,
including dikasts-numerous persons who served for a year in a
judicial capacity. 49 Interestingly enough, selection by lot was not
considered inconsistent with democracy; rather, it was regarded as
the very essence of democracy.' Selection by a lot was the one
method that assured that the judicial process would not be influ-
enced by wealth or privilege.' 5 1
Admittedly, selection by lot in the unrestricted Athenian sense
would not be appropriate in any system in which quality or com-
petence was a goal.1 52 As noted in the previous discussion of pro-
portional representation,153 however, additional structural devices
can be employed to adapt this concept to the search for quality.
C. Spec~fc Proposals
This Article first considers the problem of merit selection in
the states. After this problem is addressed, the Article asks
whether there are any special problems with merit selection perti-
nent to the federal judiciary in addition to those which arise from
the express limitations of Article III of the Constitution.
context to avoid sex discrimination); Underwood, Law and the Crystal Ball: Predicting Be-
havior with Statistical Inference and Individualized Judgment, 78 YALE L.J. 1408, 1419
(1979) (selection of candidates for admission to schools).
149. In regard to selection by lot of dikasts, who determined both the law and the facts,
see, e.g., 1 R. BONNER & G. SMITH, THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE FROM HOMER TO
ARISTOTLE 187-250 (1930); 4 G. GROTE, supra note 10 at 438-86; J. HRADLAM, upra note
2; J. MOORE, ARISTOTLE & ZENOPHON ON DEMOCRACY AND OLIGARCHY 303-10 (1975).
150. For whatever may be our difficulties the Greeks themselves seem to have had
no doubt why the lot was used at Athens, nor what its effect was. On this they are
explicit. Election by lot was a democratic institution; more, it was necessary to a
democracy. In this they are almost unanimous; friends and enemies of democ-
racy all agree on this point that in a perfectly democratic state magistrates will be
elected by lot.
J. HEAD m, supra note 10, at 12-13.
I do not mean to deny that the lot was often used in states which were not demo-
cratic, and that in the period before the Persian wars it was introduced in many
oligarchies. As will be seen below, I believe that it was. All I wish to make clear
is that, as used at Athens from the time of the Persian wars, it was of the very
essence of the democracy. The importance of the experiment at Athens caused
the older use in oligarchy states to be forgotten just as it destroyed the religious
significance.
Id. at 17 n.l.
151. Id. at 32.
152. "[M]ediocrity in office was its object, because this was the only means of ensuring
that not only the name but also the reality of power should be with the Assembly." Id.
153. See notes 134-39 supra and accompanying text.
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1. State Judges
Below are four alternative proposals, each followed by
commentary.
Alternative A
§ 1 The Judicial Nominating Commission shall consist of the
following: two lawyers, elected by the State Bar Association; six
persons popularly elected by proportional representation, of
whom one must be a lawyer and five must be nonlawyers; two
judges, elected by all judges of courts of record in the state; one
full-time member of a faculty of a law school in the state accred-
ited by the American Bar Association, elected by all full-time
members of the law school faculties of accredited law schools in
the state; and one full-time member of a nonlawyer faculty of an
accredited university within the state, elected by all nonlawyer
full-time professors in accredited universities in the state.
§ 2 Whenever a vacancy occurs in a court of record within the
state, the Judicial Nominating Commission shall prepare a list of
twelve well-qualified candidates for the position. A unanimous
vote of the twelve commissioners shall be required for inclusion of
a candidate on the list. Once the list has been prepared, the per-
son to fill the vacancy shall be selected by lot from among those
persons on the list.
Commentary
A number of groups, thus, are represented on the commission:
lawyers, judges, groups drawn from the general population, law
teachers, and nonlaw university teachers. Ideally, those selected
from among the general population will include groups or factions
in the general population that have a special interest in court deci-
sions. In particular, minority groups that are now disproportion-
ately affected by the application of the criminal law 54 might well
organize and achieve representation on the commission through
the list method of proportional representation.
Lawyers and judges, who have an obvious interest in the ad-
ministration of justice in the courts, also are represented. Since
these individuals are elected by a majority of their respective
154. It has been reported, for example, that in 1972, forty-one percent of the overall
population of jails in the United States consisted of Blacks, although the percentage of
Blacks in the general population ranged from twelve to fourteen percent. Goldkamp,
American Jails.- Characteristics and Legal Predicaments ofInmates, 15 CRIM. L. BULL. 223,
227 (1979).
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groups, dissident factions among them may not be represented di-
rectly; 155 it is hoped, however, that the beliefs, attitudes, and val-
ues of such dissidents will be expressed by the members chosen
from the general population. This hope is realistic because there
is nothing to prevent lawyers who disagree with the views of the
majority of the legal profession from working toward the election
of members selected by proportional representation from the gen-
eral population.
University teachers of law and other disciplines are repre-
sented because the commission can be improved by including in
its membership those who have pertinent interests and expertise
but whose livelihoods cannot be affected adversely by their refusal
to place a high priority on maintaining the goodwill of judges and
influential members of the bar. In this regard, the nonlaw teach-
ers may be expected to be even more independent of the bar and
judiciary than the law teacher-commissioner.1 56 Once again, dis-
sident law teachers and other university instructors can work to-
ward the appointment of like-minded persons by selecting
members of the general population through a system of propor-
tional representation.
The requirement of unanimity is designed to give each mem-
ber of the commission a veto power over the selection of nominees
by other members of the commission. Only this requirement can
assure a minority member, for example, that at least one person
satisfactory from the minority perspective will be included among
the group of nominees. This principle applies equally, however,
to all reasonably large groups with a particular point of view. A
member of the commission may say to his or her colleagues: "If
you want me to refrain from vetoing those whom you prefer, you
had better not veto my choice." At the same time, other commis-
sioners may say to the first member: "If you do not want us to
veto your choice, you had better make sure that your choice is
well-qualified."
A question arises, however, concerning the wisdom of giving
each commissioner a power of total disruption through noncoop-
155. For a discussion of various groups within the bar associations in Kansas City and
St. Louis, see R. WATSON & R. DOWNING, supra note 1, at 20-32. For a more recent study
of various groupings within the bar from the perspective of the relative prestige of various
activities, see Laumann & Heinz, Specialization and Prestige in the Legal Profession: The
Structure of Deference, 1977 AM. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 155.
156. See Fish, Questioning Judicial Candidates: What Can Merit Selectors Ask?, 62 Ju-
DICATURE 8 (1978).
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eration. It is true that such a system of anonymity permits any
one of the commissioners, presumably acting in bad faith, to frus-
trate the efforts of all the others by vetoing every candidate; how-
ever, any system will fail if those charged with the responsibility
of making it work want it to fail. Perhaps it is not unrealistic to
assume that persons who actively seek the position of nominating
commissioner and who have sufficient popular support to get
themselves elected will act in good faith.'57 When commissioners
are shown the importance of representativeness, in light of a lack
of consensus regarding some fundamental values, and when they
see that no one nominee has any greater chance than any other
nominee of finally being selected by lot, they are likely to act
responsibly.
An issue, which was alluded to earlier and deserves further
attention, is whether it is appropriate to use selection by lot when
the result may be the appointment of judges who are representa-
tive of the legal profession and not the community at large. Even
if it is assumed that lawyers have beliefs, attitudes, and values that
differ from those of the general population, 5 8 it is only partly true
157. Even jurors, who perform as such only for a brief period of time, and who there-
fore presumably do not develop the kind of role perception that is developed by judges or
commissioners who serve for longer periods of time, apparently are able to reach agree-
ment unanimously in the majority of cases. Kalven and Zeisel, for example, reported that
a hung jury resulted in only 5.5 percent of the cases considered in their much-quoted study.
H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 56 (1966).
158. It seems there is no survey that has attempted to compare the attitudes of lawyers
with those of the general population on particular issues. It does appear that the attitudes
of "professional and business" persons toward capital punishment do not differ substan-
tially from a nationwide sample of the general population. According to a recent Gallup
poll, 62% of the nationwide sample responded affirmatively to the question, "Are you in
favor of the death penalty for persons convicted of murder?"; 27% answered negatively;,
11% said that they did not know. Among "professional and business" persons, 63% an-
swered affirmatively; 29% answered negatively; 8% said that they did not know. GALLUP
OPINION INDEX 22 (Sept. 1978). Given the margin of error for such polls--three percent-
age points-it would seem that the differences between the sample of "professional and
business" persons and the nationwide sample are not statistically significant. It must be
remembered, however, that the category of "professional and business" persons is consid-
erably broader than the category of lawyers; lawyers themselves may differ significantly
from other persons within that broader category.
That there may indeed be differences between lawyers and the general population is
suggested by the results of the author's survey of law students and judges concerning capi-
tal punishment, as reported in part in an article co-authored with George Lowe. Davidow
& Lowe, Attitudes of Potential and Present Members afthe Legal Profession Toward Capital
Punishment-A Survey andAnalysis, 30 MERCER L. REV. 585 (1979). An unpublished por-
tion of that study consisted of a comparison of law students at the University of Minnesota
and judges in Minneapolis-St. Paul, St. Louis University students and St. Louis judges (city
and county), and University of Houston law students and Houston judges. No significant
differences were found between the attitudes of University of Minnesota law students and
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that selection by lot will result in the selection of judges who are
representative of the legal profession rather than the wider com-
munity. It must be remembered that six of the twelve commis-
sioners are not members of the legal profession, and they may
select nominees who are representative of community beliefs, atti-
tudes, and values. Moreover, it must be remembered that jurors,
who may be the closest analogue of judges, do not reflect the val-
ues of the total community. Jurors, for example, are not necessar-
ily representative of minors, patients in mental hospitals, convicts,
or those who have not registered to vote."5 9 Even jurors, there-
fore, are only roughly representative of the community, and there
is no reason that the nominees selected by the Judicial Nominat-
ing Commission should be less representative.
Since one objective of judicial selection is not the exclusion of
broad political considerations, but rather the inclusion of persons
representing a broad political spectrum, the Judicial Nominating
Commissioners should ask questions of potential nominees which
are designed to probe basic values. 160 Although it might still be
improper to ask a candidate how he or she would decide a specific
case, 161 wide latitude should be accorded commissioners during
interviews. Thus, commissioners might inquire, for example, as
do the commissioners in Colorado, "Do you think the rules of evi-
dence recently decided by the U.S. Supreme Court are primarily
to protect the innocent or the guilty?. . . Do you feel that there
are times when the technical rules of law should yield to common
sense and natural justice? If so, when?"'162 Similarly, candidates
might be asked, "Would you say the several States are sovereign?
... Do you think that the concepts of liberty and equality are
more likely to be harmonious, disharmonious, or something in be-
tween?" 163 Additionally, it would be appropriate to administer
questionnaires to candidates, such as the Capital Punishment Atti-
Minneapolis-St. Paul judges regarding either the general question concerning capital pun-
ishment or the more specific question relating to what a person would do if he or she were
on a jury. In the other two sets of comparisons, however, the differences between law
student attitudes and judicial attitudes were statistically significant as to both the general
and more specific questions concerning capital punishment.
159. In Texas, for example, a person is not qualified to serve on a jury if he or she is not
a registered voter, has been convicted of or is under indictment for a theft or any felony, is
insane, or is legally blind. TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 35.16 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
160. See Fish, supra note 156.
161. See note 92 supra.
162. A. ASHMAN & J. ALFINI, supra note 1, at 306, 308.
163. Fish, supra note 156 at 15.
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tude Questionnaire, ' which has been found to indicate rela-
tive "prosecution-proneness" or "defense-proneness" in criminal
cases.165
The ability to determine personal characteristics accurately is
equally important in the final selection of judges by the commis-
sion. To test for open-mindedness, one of the desirable personal
attributes, commissioners might consider the use of the "dogma-
tism scale" developed by Milton Rokeach.116 There is some ques-
tion, however, whether this scale can be used effectively with
lawyers since it requires responses to general questions removed
from any specific context and since lawyers are trained to empha-
size the factual context in their case analyses.167 Another possibil-
ity is a requirement that candidates submit to psychiatric or
polygraph examination. 16 Furthermore, the commission can ex-
plore other personal characteristics, such as honesty, courtesy, de-
cisiveness, and independence, through inquiries directed to those
who have had extensive professional dealings with the candidates.
In the design of successful merit selection systems, the stan-
dards for measuring the quality of candidates and the number of
candidates to be nominated also must be determined. Although
measuring legal competence is a subjective task, the greatest diffi-
culty is encountered in the evaluation of persons in the middle
range of competence since, as any law teacher knows, it is rela-
tively easy to identify those persons in the extreme categories, the
very good and the very bad. Because merit selection attempts to
identify excellence, however, the task is not impossible. This con-
clusion is confirmed by the experience of judicial nominating
commissions in jurisdictions utilizing some form of merit selec-
tion. Apparently, there are no complaints by commissioners that
they have been unable to distinguish the very competent from the
competent. Peter Fish, a political scientist who served on Presi-
dent Carter's merit selection commission for the Fourth Circuit,
has said, for example, that his group had no difficulty in evaluat-
ing the competence of the candidates reviewed by that commis-
sion. The commission reviewed briefs, articles, and speeches
written by lawyers, the written opinions of judges, and the pub-
164. See notes 232-33 infra.
165. See notes 234-35 infra and accompanying text.
166. M. ROKEACH, supra note 60, at 71. For a discussion of Rokeach's work, see notes
213-26 infra and accompanying text.
167. See note 226 infra.
168. See note 239 infra.
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lished articles of academicians. In all cases, personal interviews
permitted the commission to estimate the amount of outside
assistance received by candidates in the preparation of briefs, arti-
cles, or opinions. 169
The establishment of standards of competence raises the ques-
tion, however, whether the minimum qualification should be la-
beled "qualified," "well qualified," or possibly "exceptionally well
qualified."1 0 Here, the level of court and the size of the jurisdic-
tion become important. For the highest appellate courts in vari-
ous populous states, such as California and New York,
commissioners should aim for at least "well qualified" candidates
because the pool of potential candidates will be large, and there is
every reason to believe that competent candidates representing a
broad spectrum of values can be found.17' Perhaps the same stan-
dard should apply to most state supreme courts and intermediate
appellate courts. Possibly the same standard can be applied to
trial courts of general jurisdiction in large metropolitan areas,
such as New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles. Commissioners
nominating persons for trial courts in less populous areas or trial
courts of limited or special jurisdiction may have to settle for per-
sons who are merely "qualified."' 172 It is a mistake, however, to
abandon the search for quality merely because the selection is for
"inferior" court positions. After all, most people who come in
contact with the judicial system in operation do so in such courts,
and these individuals will lose vital respect for the legal system if
inferior courts are staffed by incompetents or people who are tem-
169. Phone conversations between Peter Fish and R. P. Davidow (December 10, 1980).
Similar views have been expressed by Larry Berkson, co-author of a recent study of Presi-
dent Carter's voluntary merit selection scheme. Phone conversation between Larry Berk-
son and R. P. Davidow (December 17, 1980).
170. The application of these labels is a subjective task. This subjectivity is graphically
illustrated by the action of the ABA Committee when it was confronted with the question
whether to report that Byron White was well qualified or exceptionally well qualified. See
J. GROSSMAN, supra note 1, at 102-03.
171. It may be true that some nominating commissions under existing merit selection
schemes have had difficulty in getting many competent persons, or at least many very com-
petent attorneys in private practice, see Fish, supra note 1, at 641, to agree to be considered
for judgeships; this difficulty may be the result of many factors, including inadequate re-
cruitment and a perception that it is futile for some candidates to apply because experience
has shown that the appointing authority is likely to select only members of his or her own
party. See L. BERKSON & S. CARBON, supra note 1, at 82; Fish, supra note 1, at 641.
Thorough recruitment would eliminate the first factor, selection by lot would eliminate the
second factor.
172. The size of the pool of qualified or well qualified applicants might depend upon
other considerations, including salary and career opportunities. See Davidow, supra note
55.
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peramentally unfit for the job. 7 3
As mentioned above, another issue with which the commission
must be concerned is the appropriate number of candidates who
should be nominated for judgeships. Like the minimum stan-
dards of competence, the number of nominees will be a function
of the size of the candidate pool. No difficulty should be encoun-
tered, therefore, in populous states or districts in choosing at least
twelve candidates.
The problem encountered by the smaller state or district can
be mitigated by adapting a procedure of French judicial selection.
In France-a unitary as opposed to a federal state-judges are not
recruited locally. Instead, these judges are recruited centrally and
assigned wherever needed. 174 Similarly, in less populated states, a
single, central nominating commission might consider candidates
from anywhere in the state for a trial court with limited geo-
graphic jurisdiction. 175 Although local residents might not know
the judge personally before he or she assumed office, this lack of
knowledge might be an advantage. If the judge were well known
locally before assuming the bench, the appearance of justice might
be compromised. Those who had not known the judge personally
prior to appearing before the bench would be disadvantaged vis-
A-vis those who had known the judge previously. 176
Alternative B
§ I The Judicial Nominating Commission shall consist of
twelve persons elected popularly by proportional representation
and four nonvoting members selected as follows: one member of
the State Bar Association, elected by all members of the State Bar
Association; one judge, elected by all judges of courts of record in
the state; one full-time teacher in a law school within the state
accredited by the American Bar Association, elected by all full-
time law teachers in accredited law schools within the state; and
one full-time, nonlawyer teacher in an accredited university,
173. See NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND
GOALS, COURTS 145 (1973).
174. G. VERPRAET, supra note 10, at 60-63.
175. Several states already have a single commission to nominate judges for the whole
state. See, e.g., WYo. CONST. art. 5, § 4.
176. Lon Fuller suggested that there is a tension between the desire for due process and
the desire to be treated as an individual. Fuller, Two Princoiles fHuman Association, in
VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS [NOMOS XII 3 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1969). Intimacy
is a virtue so long as the individual is a member of the intimate group and the decision is
favorable. If one is not an intimate or if the decision is unfavorable, due process seems to
be the preferred concept.
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elected by all full-time, nonlawyer teachers in accredited universi-
ties in the state.
§ 2 Whenever a vacancy occurs in a court of record within the
state, the Judicial Nominating Commission shall prepare a list of
twelve well-qualified candidates for the position. A unanimous
vote of the twelve voting commissioners shall be required for in-
clusion of a candidate on the list. Once the list has been prepared,
the person to fill the vacancy shall be selected by lot from among
those persons on the list.
Commentary
Most of the discussion of alternative A could be repeated here.
Alternative B differs from alternative A only in regard to the com-
position of the nominating commission. Alternative B does not
explicitly recognize special interest groups. Such groups have to
organize, therefore, to elect lay persons representing their beliefs,
attitudes, and values. Since more commissioners are elected
under a system of proportional representation by the general pop-
ulation, minorities constituting a small proportion of the general
population will be more likely to gain representation on the com-
mission. Finally, members of the commission with greater exper-
tise cannot dominate other members who lack such expertise; 177
such expertise is available to everyone in the form of four nonvot-
ing members of the commission. Furthermore, as was true under
alternative A, final selection is by lot.
Alternative C
§ 1 The Judicial Nominating Commission shall consist of the
following: two lawyers, elected by the State Bar Association; six
persons popularly elected by proportional representation, of
whom one must be a lawyer and five must be nonlawyers; two
judges, elected by all judges of courts of record in the state; one
full-time member of a faculty of a law school in a state accredited
by the American Bar Association, elected by all full-time mem-
bers of the law school faculties of accredited law schools in the
state; and one full-time member of a nonlawyer faculty of an ac-
credited university within the state, elected by all nonlawyer full-
time teachers in accredited universities in the state.
177. This situation is to be contrasted with that in Missouri, where the judge member of
the commission is usually unduly influential See R. WATSON & R. DOWNING, supra note
1, at 339.
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§ 2 When a vacancy occurs, the Judicial Nominating Commis-
sion shall:
a. actively recruit candidates by publicizing the vacancy in
various appropriate print media and by personally solicit-
ing persons worthy of consideration;
b. acting as a full commission, interview each person whom at
least one member of the Commission wants to interview;
c. disqualify any person after an interview if nine of the com-
missioners vote to disqualify; and
d. select twelve nominees from among those interviewed but
not disqualified, with each member of the Commission
choosing one of the nominees. No two members, however,
may nominate the same person. If more than one member
wants to nominate the same person, the lot shall be used to
determine which of these members shall have the first right
to nominate.
§ 3 The vacancy shall be filled by lot from among those per-
sons nominated in accordance with § 2.
Commentary
The nominating commission under alternative C is the same as
the commission under alternative A. The process of selection is
altered, however, to handle possible disruption through noncoop-
eration. Under alternative C, the commission first acts as a
recruiting commission, then as a screening commission, and
finally as a nominating commission. To ensure full minority par-
ticipation, any candidate is entitled to an interview if even one
commissioner requests such action. Screening occurs only after an
interview; thus, a decision to disqualify is taken on the basis of the
most complete information available, including those intangible
qualities revealed only through a personal interview.
Under alternative C, no one person can disrupt the proceed-
ings through noncooperation since no individual is given a veto
power. On the other hand, no one commissioner is guaranteed a
nominee of his or her choice since such candidates can be ex-
cluded at the screening stage. Once again, this alternative will
work only if the commissioners act in good faith. Furthermore,
this alternative preserves the central feature of final selection by
lot.
Alternative D
§ 1 When a judicial vacancy occurs, the Judicial Screening
Committee [selected in accordance with the provisions of § 1, al-
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ternative A] shall screen any person interested in seeking the
judgeship and shall certify those who are deemed [well] qualified.
§ 2 Those certified as [well] qualified under § 1 shall receive [a
specified sum] from public funds to be used for campaigning in
accordance with the limitations contained in § 7B(1) of the ABA's
Code of Judicial Conduct.
§ 3 On the basis of proportional representation, voters shall
select twelve nominees from among those certified as [well] quali-
fied under § 1.
§ 4 Following the election under § 3, the judge shall be se-
lected by lot from among the twelve nominees selected under § 3.
Commentary
Alternative D gives the electorate a greater and more direct
role in the selection of nominees. Minimum qualifications,
whether "qualified" or "well qualified," are secured by a screen-
ing committee, which must certify each candidate appropriately
before that person's name can appear on the ballot. Public financ-
ing mitigates the disadvantage now burdening minorities and im-
pecunious candidates. Once again, the selection of a relatively
large number of nominees (here through proportional representa-
tion) assures representativeness, as does final selection by lot.
2. Federal Judges
Here, the basic question is whether there are special considera-
tions relating to federal judges that should lead to a different
method of judicial selection from that proposed for the states. No
such considerations seem to exist, however, with regard to the
Supreme Court, courts of appeals, and district courts. Indeed, to
the extent that federal courts have been involved more in poli-
cymaking than state courts, 78 the need for representativeness
would seem to be greater in the federal judiciary than in the state
178. The assumption on the part of many people today is that the Supreme Court is
"making law" to a greater extent than the lower federal courts and the state courts. Exhibit
"A" might very well be Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), in which the Court placed
substantial restrictions on the power of the states to enforce abortion laws. The assumption
should not be made, however, that such policymaking is, or has been, the special province
of the United States Supreme Court. Even in colonial days, the courts exercised considera-
ble policymaking in regard to slavery. For example see A. HIGGINBOTHAM, IN THE MAT-
TER OF COLOR 28 (1978). Even in England, where there is no written constitution to which
a court can appeal, the House of Lords has rendered decisions incorporating substantial
policymaking. See, eg., Shaw v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [1962] A.C. 220 (1961),
in which the House of Lords upheld a prosecution for "conspiracy to corrupt public
1981]
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judiciary. A federal constitutional amendment would be required,
however, to implement any one of the four alternatives outlined in
the previous sections. On the national level, alternatives A or C
are the most manageable of the four. Perhaps primary elections
would be required for those commissioners not selected by pro-
portional representation; the single transferable vote would make
such elections unnecessary in the case of those selected by propor-
tional representation. A more difficult question, however, relates
to the tenure and discipline of federal judges, a matter dealt with
in another article. 17 9
One federal judicial officer, however, deserves special mention:
the United States Magistrate.18 0 Magistrates are now selected by
the district courts, utilizing merit selection panels.'18  If district
court judges were themselves more representative (because se-
lected, for example, in accordance with alternative A, B, C, or D),
then perhaps it would be appropriate to leave final selection to the
district court. Such a system of selection would not be appropri-
ate, however, in districts containing only a few judges. Moreover,
the present system does not give assurance of ultimate representa-
tiveness; therefore, even here, one of these alternatives is prefera-
ble, although implementation of one of them would probably
require a constitutional amendment.18 2
V. CONCLUSION
Despite assertions to the contrary, credible evidence suggests
that some form of merit selection can produce better judges than a
system of election. '8 3 The real challenge is to design a system that
can achieve the twin goals of quality and representativeness.
Quality of judicial personnel is an obvious goal. Representative-
ness in regard to beliefs, attitudes, and values is an appropriate
morals," not merely in the absence of legislation by Parliament, but arguably in violation
of the spirit of an act of Parliament.
179. See note 54 supra.
180. 28 U.S.C. §§ 631-639 (1976), as amended by Federal Magistrate Act of 1979, Pub.
L. No. 96-82, 93 Stat. 643.
181. Federal Magistrate Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-82 § 3, 93 Stat. 644-45.
182. It seems unlikely that Congress, consistently with Art. II, § 2, cl. 2 of the Constitu-
tion, could grant the "Courts of Law" the power to appoint magistrates while limiting the
courts' choice to persons selected by lot. Cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (invalida-
tion of appointment provision that departed from literal terms of the Appointments Clause
by involving members of Congress in the appointment of members of the Federal Elections
Commission).
183. See notes 109-10, 124-26 & 128-33 supra and accompanying text.
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goal because of the absence of consensus on such beliefs, attitudes,
and values.
This Article has proposed four alternatives to achieve these
goals.1 84 Each proposal involves the use of proportional represen-
tation, either in the selection of at least some of the commissioners
or more directly in the selection of the nominees, and ultimate
selection by lot from among the relatively large number of
nominees. 8 5
There is no perfect way to select judges, just as there are no
perfect judges. Yet, at present, all reasonable possibilities for judi-
cial selection have not been exhausted. The four proposals in this
Article, while adding to the possibilities for judicial selection, cer-
tainly do not exhaust all possibilities for reform. Nevertheless,
these proposals do indicate that a better system of judicial selec-
tion can and should be implemented.
APPENDIX
Social Science Assistance in the Discovery of Information
Pertinent to the Judicial Selection Process
1. Competence
In the past, social science techniques have been used in legal
contexts. Such techniques have been used in the development of
standardized tests, such as the Law School Admissions Test;8 6
law school examinations, however, traditionally have required es-
says.'8 7 In addition, various state bar examinations today often
include standardized portions (the Multistate Bar Examina-
tion).' s Furthermore, with respect to lawyer competence, at least
two quantitative studies have been published recently.'8 9 No ef-
184. See notes 154-82 supra and accompanying text.
185. Id.
186. Virtually all law schools in the United States require that applicants take the Law
School Admissions Test as a condition precedent to admission to law school. See EDUCA-
TIONAL TESTING SERVICE, LAw SCHOOL ADMISSION BULLETIN (1979-80). The Law
School Admissions Test is a "standardized test designed to measure certain mental abilities
important in the study of law and, thus, to aid law schools in assessing the academic prom-
ise of their applicants." Id. at 4.
187. Traditionally, law school examinations are not standardized; they are generally of
the problem-solving variety and are subjective, both with regard to the writing of the ex-
aminations and with regard to the grading of them. In contrast, the standardized examina-
tion is not subjective in its scoring, but is, however, subjective in the writing of its
questions.
188. E.g., National Conference of Bar Examiners, Multistate Bar Examination Ques-
tions IV (1978).
189. A. PARTRIDGE & G. BERmANT, THE QUALITY OF ADVOCACY IN THE FEDERAL
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fort has been made, however, to correlate the law school related
tests (LSAT, law school examinations, and bar examinations) with
evaluations of lawyer competency' 9 0 -a subject that presumably
is relevant to the judicial selection process. Although these law-
yer competency studies may be "quantitative," in the sense that
they can be scored and summarized numerically, they depend on
subjective evaluations."19
2. Representativeness
Characteristics other than competence, however, may appear
at first glance to be more amenable to quantitative, possibly less
subjective, analyses. Representativeness, for example, has already
been shown to be an important factor. Suppose, for instance, that
individuals want to select a judge who is generally sympathetic to
persons accused of crime to balance a court that contains judges
hostile to such accused persons, or vice versa. Several techniques
are available. If consideration should be given to a presently sit-
ting appellate judge for promotion to a higher court, such tech-
niques as cumulative scaling or bloc analysis could be employed.
Cumulative scaling attempts to measure the extent to which indi-
vidual judges on a collegial court can be compared on a contin-
uum regarding attitudes towards a particular type of case.' 92 In
COURTS (1978); Maddi, TrialAdvocacy Competence: The Judicial Perspective, 1978 AM. B.
FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 105.
190. Attempts have been made to relate grades in law school or grades on the Law
School Admissions Test to performance on the bar examination. Carlson & Werts, Rela-
tionships Among Law School Predictors, Law School Peaformance, and Bar Examination
Results, in 3 LAW SCH. ADMISSION COUNCIL, LAW SCH. ADMISSION RESEARCH 211 (1977).
In two studies of the competence of trial lawyers, the investigators made no effort to relate
the evaluation of lawyers to their performance in law school or to their performance on the
Law School Admissions Test. See note 189 supra.
191. In a study of the competence of lawyers appearing in federal courts, the investiga-
tors caution that
It is important to recognize that everything in this report is ultimately founded on
the judgments of judges and lawyers about the quality of lawyer performances.
Judges were asked to evaluate particular performances without being given any
standard of the measurement of performance quality. Judges and lawyers were
asked for their opinions about the quality of lawyer performances, again without
being given any standard.
A. PARTRIDGE & G. BERMANT, supra note 189, at 1. A further indicator of the subjectivity
of the evaluation is found in the following statement: "Another part of the research
showed that district judges are not highly consistent with one another in rating perform-
ances using the seven category scale provided in the research instruments." Id. at 5.
192. Such scales are cumulative in the sense that as an individual progresses along the
scale, that person encounters judges who are, for example, increasingly more sympathetic
toward persons accused of a crime. Cases are arranged so that the first category includes
cases in which virtually all judges, including those with minimal sympathy for the accused,
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contrast, bloc analysis attempts to identify groups of judges on a
collegial court who vote together in certain types of cases. 193
Apart from methodological differences, these two techniques thus
represent differences in emphasis. There is a degree of overlap
that is demonstrated, for example, by the fact that cumulative
scaling may suggest groups of judges who respond similarly to a
particular type of issue.194
These techniques, despite their statistical sophistication,1 95 are
often imprecise and subjective. Tendencies may be detected in
groups of judges, or even in single judges, 196 but these techniques
do not ensure the infallible prediction of how a judge will decide a
close case. Although such prediction is not impossible, 197 how-
ever, the question remains whether complicated statistical tech-
niques can reveal more than nonstatistical analysis by an
experienced court observer. 198
Part of the problem is inherent in social science: the applica-
tion to human beings of techniques and assumptions that charac-
terize the physical sciences. 99 By looking for similarities that will
find it possible to vote for the accused; other categories of cases then are assembled in
which only those judges who are somewhat more sympathetic to the accused will vote for
the accused. A good discussion of scaling that is intelligible to the lay person is found in
W. MURPHY & J. TANENHAUS, THE STUDY OF PUBLIC LAW 126-40 (1972).
193. The earliest effort to apply bloc voting analysis techniques to judicial opinions is
found in C. PRITCHETT, THE ROOSEVELT COURT (1948). A more recent example of the use
of bloc voting techniques is Ulmer, Voting Blocs and "Access" to the Supreme Court
1947-56 Terms, 16 Ju imETIcs J. 6 (1975). See generally W. MURPHY & J. TANENHAUS,
supra note 192, at 159-76.
194. See, eg., G. SCHUBERT, THE JUDICIAL MIND 276 (1965).
195. See, eg., id; G. SCHUBERT, THE JUDICIAL MIND REVIsrED (1974). Three types
of analyses used in the second work are "principal-components factor analysis, oblique
factor analysis, and smallest-space analysis." Id. at ix.
196. See, e-g., G. SCHUBERT, THE JUDICIAL MIND REVISITED at 86-87.
197. See, eg., Schubert, Judicial Attitudes in Voting Behavior: The 1961 Term of the
United States Supreme Court, 28 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 100 (1963).
198. Schubert mentions Fred Rodel's accurate prediction regarding the outcome in
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). Id. at 103-05. The author then describes his own
techniques, involving factor analysis and cumulative scaling. Id. at 108-12. The author
fails, however, to demonstrate that his own system is more accurate than Fred Rodell's.
For a general review of the strength and weaknesses of social science methodology as
applied to judicial decisiomaking, see Symposium" Social Science Approaches to the Judi-
cial Process, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1551 (1966). For a more recent, but less comprehensive,
treatment of the same subject, see Symposium EmpiricalApproaches to Judicial Behavior,
42 U. CiN. L. REv. 589 (1973).
199. The physical sciences assume a distinction between fact and value, an assumption
that may not be appropriate in the case of human interaction. See generally, Fuller, Human
Purpose and Natural Law, 3 NAT. L.F. 68 (1958); Nagel, On the Fusion of Fact and Value"
AReply to Professor Fuller, 3 NAT. L.F. 77 (1958); Fuller,A Rejoinder to Professor Nagel, 3
NAT. L.F. 83 (1958); Nagel, Fact, Value and Human Purpose, 4 NAT. L.F. 26 (1959).
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permit classification, social scientists often unduly simplify. Much
of the actual complexity is disregarded, sometimes because it does
not fit neatly into the researcher's conceptual or statistical
model.2"° One common deficiency, for example, is the considera-
tion of only nonunanimous decisions of a multimember court.201
Although the reason for this exclusion is understanda-
ble-unanimous decisions reveal nothing about the differences
between and among members of the court--the exclusion never-
theless may result in a distorted view of the court's work. This
distortion may occur because dissents, which are the only clues to
differences among court members that are utilized by bloc voting
and cumulative scaling techniques, may not accurately reflect the
200. In his study of Supreme Court opinions announced during the 1962 term, for ex-
ample, Schubert indicated that he excluded, among other cases, those pertaining merely to
jurisdictional issues. Schubert, supra note 197, at 112. It is not always easy, however, to
distinguish between 'Jurisdictional issues" and issues on the merits. Court watchers have
long suspected that decisions in the area of "standing," "political questions," "ripeness,"
and "mootness" sometimes conceal substantive decisions that might otherwise be unpopu-
lar with vocal minorities. See, e.g., Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972) (finding of plaintiff's
lack of standing to challenge army surveillance of civilian political activity apparently
based on a decision on the merits).
Some of the complexity that is absent from such social science studies is illustrated by
the following passage:
In appraising the significance of a dissenting opinion it should be remembered
that judges often, tacitly or openly, use the threat of a dissent to obtain some
modification in the majority opinion. In deciding how firmly to hold out, the
judge inclined toward dissent would be less than human if he were not influenced
by the attractiveness of the role in which a dissent casts him. Or suppose that his
appointment to the bench was heralded by the National Review or the Nation as
bringing a wholesome 'conservative' or 'liberal' influence to the court. The cases
he confronts offer him for a long time no opportunity to demonstrate to those who
believe in his judicial philosophy that he has not deserted them. In such situa-
tions the opportunity to write a dissenting opinion in an appropriate case becomes
especially attractive and he is likely to take full advantage of the occasion. Since
he is relieved of any complicity in the decision actually reached, he may in fact be
moved to show by words that his 'personal values and attitudes' remain what they
were when he was just a plain, ordinary citizen. In so doing he will please not
only his well-wishers but the researchers as well, for his dissent will help to load
the figures in favor of a result that the researcher, if he too is human, cannot but
hope will emerge from his labor.
In his report on researches of the kind under discussion, Grossman asserts that
'these explorations' will 'tend to focus on properties of behavior which are amena-
ble to generalization-for example, on judges' votes rather than on their opin-
ions.' But this emphasis will surely be misplaced if, as may very well be the case,
the primary motive for casting the dissenting vote was to procure the opportunity
to write the dissenting opinion. And it should be remembered that filing a dissent
without opinion can often be interpreted as staking out a claim to write a dissent-
ing opinion on a later and perhaps more suspicious occasion.
Fuller, An Afterward- Science and the Judicial Process, 79 HARV. L. Rnv. 1604, 1611-12
(1966) (footnote omitted).
201. In one of his studies, Schubert notes that "unanimous and jurisdictional decisions
are excluded." G. SCHUBERT, supra note 194, at 44.
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actual differences among those court members.2 °2 Moreover,
many cases defy easy classification, especially those in which the
opposing parties' claims rely on fundamental values, sometimes
even the same value.20 3
If a particular candidate is not currently on a collegial court,
202. Fuller describes the problem in this fashion:
In estimating how much is left out when unanimous decisions are excluded from
the study, one must recall that the impression of solidarity conveyed by such deci-
sions can be quite specious. One of the most perceptive of our state judges once
attempted to describe how unanimous decisions look to those who reach them.
With his own court, he said, some of these decisions were rated as 90-10, while
others might be rated as 51-49, in the second class it having been touch-and-go as
to how they would finally be decided. The 90-10 decisions furnish a firm founda-
tion for a future development; the principle implicit in them is likely to be ex-
tended broadly by analogy. Cases of the second class will be likely to meet an
opposite fate. The 51-49 decisions do not necessarily represent any division of
opinion among the court; all the judges may have felt substantially the same way
and all may have been equally pulled just past the point of indecision in finally
reaching a unanimous conclusion. When we thus look behind the blank outer
wall of unanimity, it becomes apparent how much judicial preference schedules
may be falsified (say, on a Guttman scaling) when unanimous decisions are left
out of account. It should be remembered that the reciprocal adjustments and
compromises that go into a unanimous decision may have a carry-over effect on
the judge who, in a later case, debates whether to file a dissenting opinion.
The chief distortion introduced by the exclusion of unanimous decisions re-
sults not from the fact that a veil is drawn over divergencies that may lie behind
such decisions, but from the undue weight it lends to dissent. By entering a dis-
sent a judge gains for himself the opportunity to engage in a very special form of
literary exercise, the dissenting opinion.
Fuller, supra note 200, at 1610.
203. It is understood well by constitutional experts, for example, that there is a tension
between the free exercise and establishment clauses of the first amendment. In such cases
as Sherbert v. Verer, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), a
failure to grant an exemption from an otherwise general governmental requirement was
regarded as an infringement of free exercise rights. The granting of such an exemption,
however, could be regarded as an establishment of religion because it prefers those individ-
uals who adhere to a particular religious belief over those individuals who adhere to other
religious beliefs or no belief at all. Despite this tension, one of Schubert's subscales simply
is entitled "religious freedom." G. SCHUBERT, supra note 195, at 154. It is not evident,
therefore, whether the Verner and Yoder decisions can be categorized simply under the
rubric of "religious freedom."
One of Schubert's scales is "political [as contrasted with economic] liberalism." Id.
Presumably, "political liberalism" includes supporting claims based on the freedom of
speech. This definition raises the question of how to categorize such cases as Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). In Red Lion, the argument can be made
that the decision to uphold FCC regulations which require broadcasters to provide time to
candidates whose opponents have been endorsed by the television station is inconsistent
with first amendment rights, since the television station is limited in what it can say on the
air. Alternatively, given the present technological limitations on broadcasting, the FCC
regulation can be regarded as consistent with the first amendment because it promotes
fuller discussion of political matters and gives media access to those persons who would
otherwise not have such access and thus the opportunity to speak freely before the public.
The challenge, therefore, is in determining which side of this case represents "political
liberalism"
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techniques such as bloc voting and cumulative scaling are un-
available. There are, however, studies that have attempted to
show correlations between certain background characteristics of a
judge and his or her decisions in actual cases. 2° The knowledge
of these background characteristics of a candidate may permit the
prediction of his or her decisions in certain cases.
One of the principal problems with these efforts, which also
occurs with bloc voting and cumulative scaling, is imprecision. In
one instance, for example, a complex statistical technique known
as multiple regression was used to show the extent to which party
affiliation was related to decisions in criminal and economic cases.
Although party affiliation accounted for forty-four percent of the
variance in the economic cases, party affiliation accounted for
only seven percent of the variance in criminal cases.20 Thus,
knowledge of a candidate's party preference would not permit the
accurate prediction of that candidate's judicial behavior in crimi-
nal cases. These observations do not suggest, however, that polit-
ical science studies are useless because a conception of the larger
picture is often helpful. Information, for example, on the extent to
which judges on a particular court are representative of the rele-
vant community may be useful,2 ° 6 although such studies seem to
be of doubtful utility in evaluating a specific person.
204. E.g., S. NAGEL, supra note 79.
205. By itself, each judicial characteristic cannot explain a large part of the vari-
ance among judges' decisional propensities. For example, if one were to rely only
upon political party affiliation to predict a judge's tendency to find for the defense
in criminal cases, one could account for only 7 percent of the variance (or .26
squared); using the twelve variables for which standardized regression weights
could be computed, one can account for 43 percent of the variance. In fact, one
can account for 25 percent of the variance by just using the variables of political
party affiliation, attitude on economic issues and attitude toward treatment of
criminals.. . [These three variables had substantial, non-redundant correlations
with the tendency to hold for the defense in criminal cases.
The effect of multiple correlation used to interpret data collected from judges
hearing civil cases involving economic issues is more dramatic. Without this
more sophisticated analysis, political party affiliation accounts for only 14 percent
of the variance. When adjustments for the effect of other variables are made,
however, political party affiliation can account for 44 percent of the variance. If
the sum of the additional variance explained by each of the ten variables for
which the computer could find standardized regression weights. . . is computed,
approximately 90 percent of the variance of the dependent variable can thus be
explained.
Nagel, Multiple Correlation of Judicial Backgrounds and Decisions, 2 FLA. ST. U.L. REv.
258, 275 (1974) (footnote omitted).
206. See note 79 supra and accompanying text.
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3. Impartiality and Openmindedness
In addition to quality and representativeness, the judicial char-
acteristics of independence, impartiality, and openmindedness are
desirable. Independence may be a function of the conditions
under which a judge holds office: e.g., length of term and the pos-
sibilities of discipline and removal. 207 To the extent that indepen-
dence varies among candidates it may depend on the candidate's
financial or other interests. 0 Presumably, such independence
207. Presumably, the greatest amount of independence is provided by the federal sys-
tem, under which judges enjoy life tenure with a guarantee of undiminished salary. U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 1. In the federal context, a common assumption has been that the only
possibility of removal is through the impeachment process. U.S. CONsT., art. II, § 4; Note,
Judicial Disability andthe Good Behavior Clause, 85 YALE L.J. 706 (1976). Contra, Snarr &
Parker, The "Good Behavior"Alternative to Impeachment: A Proposalfor the More Effective
Use o/Judicial Councils, 4 J. CONTEMP. L. 38 (1977) (assumption that judiciary has the
power to police itself). With respect to state judgeships, at or near the other end of the
spectrum is Alabama, where even supreme court judges have only a six-year term, ALA.
CONsT. amend. 328, § 6.15, and can be removed by a Court of the Judiciary, id. at § 6.18,
on the recommendation of a judicial inquiry commission, id. at § 6.17, for "violation of a
canon of judicial ethics, misconduct in office, [or] failure to perform his duties . Id.
at § 6.18.
208. When, for example, the Senate was considering Justice Fortas for the chiefjustice-
ship of the United States Supreme Court, an issue arose regarding the propriety of his
receiving $50,000 for his participation in a seminar conducted at American University.
The following excerpts from the senate hearings illustrate the kinds of problems that may
arise when a judge participates in extrajudicial activities for a fee:
Mr. Chairman, during the noon recess, I have had opportunity to look at the
biographies in "Who's Who" of the five gentlemen who are mentioned by Dean
Tennery, as having contributed $30,000 to American University for the purpose
of financing the summer seminar at which Justice Fortas presided. The five gen-
tlemen are no ordinary group of men. They are all important leaders in the busi-
ness and financial world. As I look over their biographies, I see one man who
describes himself as the chairman of the New York Stock Exchange. Two of
them are directors of Braniff Airways. Three of them are deeply involved in the
department store business. They hold important posts on banks and insurance
companies and on major utilities.
Any one of these men could easily become involved in any number of suits
which might reach the Supreme Court. They represent a complex of business and
financial holdings that could scarcely be extricated from anything touching upon
the Nation's economy. It would place the nominee in a difficult position if any
one of these holdings were involved in litigation before the Court.
In studying these biographies, I was surprised to find that none of them, de-
spite their numerous business and philathropist connection, has apparently ever
had anything to do with American University. I find that they have gone to such
schools as Tulane, New York University, Dartmouth, Harvard, University of
Rochester, Columbia, and Ohio State. One of the gentlemen belongs to the Visit-
ing Committee of Harvard University and is a member of the Corporation of
Northeastern University. Yet all of them, when approached by Mr. Paul Porter,
suddenly opened their purse strings to American University, with which they had
no connection recorded in "Who's Who," and which is not even in the city where
any of them live or work. This appears to be an extraordinary burst of spontane-
ous generosity.
Nominations ofAbe Fortas and Homer Thornberry: Hearings on Nomination ofAbe Fortas
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can be assessed without resort to social science methodologies.
Impartiality and openmindedness, however, have been the
subject of social science study. At the outset, the determination
must be made whether these characteristics are separable phe-
nomena, since one might be related to ideology while the other
might be related to basic personality.
The first major effort to resolve this question evolved from an
investigation of antisemitism during World War HI.209 In 1950, a
report on the use of an attitude scale, the "F" scale, was pub-
lished.2 10 Although the title of the work suggested a general test
of authoritarianism, which might include the notion of a lack of
openmindedness, 2 1' this scale was, more accurately, a test of
"right wing" authoritarianism-hence the name "F" scale ("F"
standing for "facist").21 2
Later, Milton Rokeach developed a "dogmatism" scale"l3 that,
in his view, measured an underlying personality trait unrelated to
ideology. He found for instance, that English Communists were
the most dogmatic of any group that he tested 4.2 1  This finding
appeared to refute the conclusion of those who had claimed to
find an association between "right wing" political views and
dogmatism. 5
of Tennessee, to be Chief Justice of the United States and Nomination ofHomer Thornberry
of Texas, to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, Before the Senate
Comm on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 1306-07 (1968) (remarks of Sen. Thurmond).
209. E. FROMM, ESCAPE FROM FREEDOM (1941); Maslow, The Authoritarian Character
Structure, 18 J. Soc. PSYCH. 401 (1943).
210. T. ADORNO, E. FRENKEL-BRUNSWIK, D. LEVINSON, & R. SANFORD, THE AU-
THORITARIAN PERSONALITY (1950).
211. It might be hypothesized that one reason why people in modem soci-
ety-even those who are otherwise intelligent or "informed"-resort to primitive,
oversimplified explanations of human events is that so many of the ideas and
observations needed for an adequate account are not allowed to enter into the
calculations: because they are affect-laden and potentially anxiety-producing, the
weak ego cannot include them within its scheme of things.
Id. at 236.
212. Id. at 224.
213. M. ROKEACH, supra note 60, at 73-80.
214. Id. at 115.
215. Curiously, some researchers have tended to ignore this central principle of
Rokeach's research-that there is no necessary relationship between dogmatism or authori-
tarianism and any particular political view. In Jurow, New Data on the Effect of a "Death
Qualed"Jury on the Guilt Determination Process, 84 HARV. L. REv. 567 (1971), for exam-
ple, the author referred to another scale developed by Rokeach as a "conservatism-liber-
alism scale." Id. at 579. Jurow missed the whole point; "[c]onservatism-liberalism scale"
was not such a scale but was rather an "opinionation" scale that was designed to measure
general intolerance. M. ROKEACH, supra note 60, at 80. Possibly Jurow's error illustrates
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According to Rokeach, the essence of the open mind is the ca-
pacity to "[r]eceive, evaluate, and act on relevant information re-
ceived from the outside on its own intrinsic merits, unencumbered
by irrelevant factors in the situation arising from within the per-
son or from the outside." '216 Perhaps, then, openmindedness is
distinguishable from impartiality, with the latter trait suggesting
an ideological standard.
If it is assumed for the sake of argument, that Rokeach is cor-
rect,217 the question arises whether openmindedness can be tested.
To address that question, an examination should be made of
Rokeach's dogmatism scale-a series of forty statements with
which an individual can express agreement or disagreement on a
six-point scale, ranging from plus three ("I agree very much") to
minus three ("I disagree very much").21 8 Apart from methodolog-
ical problems of special interest to social scientists, 219 problems
may arise because of possible ambiguity in some of the state-
ments. One statement, for example, reads: "The principles I have
come to believe in are quite different from those believed in by
most people. ' 220 Agreement with this statement supposedly is in-
dicative of the closed mind. As Rokeach himself has written else-
where, however, an attitude is more than an attitude toward an
the principle of selective perception. See Hastorf & Cantril, They Saw A Game: A Case
Study, 49 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCH. 129 (1954). Perhaps Jurow, believing that the
"liberal" position is more attractive than the "conservative" position, assumed that authori-
tarianism or dogmatism goes with "conservatism" and thus ignored evidence to the
contrary.
216. M. ROKEACH, supra note 60, at 57.
217. A discussion of authoritarianism, including a discussion of Rokeach's dogmatism
and works supporting the Rokeach thesis, is found in J. KIRSCHT & R. DILLEHAY, DIMEN-
SIONS OF AUTHORITARIANISM: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH AND THEORY (1967). The possi-
bility that Rokeach is right in suggesting that dogmatism is unrelated to political ideology
finds support in Davidow & Lowe, Attitudes of Potential and Present Members of the Legal
Profession Towards Capital Punishment-4 Survey andAnalysis, 30 MERCER L. REV. 585
(1979).
218. M. ROKEACH, supra note 60, at 73-80. Note that the respondent has no opportu-
nity to "straddle the fence"; he or she must respond either positively or negatively.
whether this failure to permit an ambivalent response distorts the findings is disputable.
For a general discussion of the use of this Likert-type scale, see A. OPPENHEIM, QUESTION-
NAIRE DESIGN AND ATTrrUDE MEASUREMENT 133-42 (1966).
219. See, ag., A. OPPENHEIM, supra note 218, at 133-42. Another problem arises from
the fact that "[flor all statements, agreement is scored as closed, and disagreement as
open." M. ROKEACH, supra note 60, at 73. This problem is described as the "problem of
response bias"-that is, the "problem that may arise if a person is inclined to respond
affirmatively, regardless of the question." This problem, which is common to both
Rokeach's scale and the original F scale, is discussed in J. KIRSCHT & R. DILLEHAY, supra
note 217, at 13-29.
220. M. ROKEACH, supra note 60, at 74.
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object in the abstract; it also includes an attitude toward the situa-
tion or context in which the object is perceived.22" ' The problem
with the quoted statement is that its context is unclear. Depend-
ing on the part of the country in which one lives, one might be
able to answer quite accurately that his or her principles differ
from those of most people in that part of the country. A person
whose views are similar to those of even the moderate members of
the British Labor Party, for example, can accurately state that his
or her views differ from those of most people in west Texas. 2
Another statement in Rokeach's dogmatism scale which is sup-
posed to indicate a closed mind, is the following: "In this compli-
cated world of ours the only way we can know what's going on is
to rely on leaders or experts who can be trusted.' 2  Again, the
context is unclear. If the question related to whether more money
should be spent on extracurricular activities at the local high
school, one might agree that a person should be able to discover
the pertinent facts for himself or herself and make an independent
decision. If the question, however, is whether SALT II should be
ratified224 or the MX missile system deployed, 225 the vast majority
of people will have to rely on the advice of other persons whose
judgment is trusted.
Thus, there is some doubt as to whether Rokeach's dogmatism
scale could be used successfully to discover dogmatism, especially
among lawyers, who have been trained to focus on the ways in
which a different context can make a difference in the application
of the same general principle. 26 This doubt should not lead to the
conclusion that Rokeach is necessarily wrong as his conclusions
221. M. ROKEACH, BELIEFS, ATTITUDES, AND VALUES, 118-19 (1968).
222. An individual living in west Texas cannot escape the conclusion that many people
in this area have not accepted the desirability or legitimacy of labor unions, much less the
doctrine of the British Labor Party concerning the governmental ownership of major trans-
portation systems and industries.
223. M. ROKEACH, supra note 60, at 79.
224. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, July 8, 1979, § 4, at 5, col. 1.
225. E.g., compare N.Y. Times, July 1, 1979, § 4, at 20, col. 3, with N.Y. Times, Aug. 8,
1979, § I, at 6, col. 4.
226. In his famous series of lectures to first-year law students at Columbia, Karl Llew-
ellyn said, among other things:
Everything, everything, everything, big or small, a judge may .ay in an opinion, Is to
be read with primary reference to the particular dispute, the particular question
before him. You are not to think that the words mean what they might if they
stood alone. You are to have your eye on the case in hand, and to learn how to
interpret all that has been said merely as a reason for deciding that case that way.
K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 43 (1960) (emphasis supplied).
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may have intuitive appeal. His methodology simply may be of
limited utility in the assessment of potential judges.
Apart from personality, the question arises whether there are
some acceptable or unacceptable political beliefs for which testing
may be desirable, on the assumption that unacceptable political
beliefs might constitute a lack of impartiality. Although people
disagree about many fundamental political issues, some views are
enshrined in the Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme
Court. The Court, for example, has held that the concept of due
process includes the notion that the prosecution in a criminal case
has the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.227 Ar-
guably, any person not agreeing with this principal lacks imparti-
ality in criminal cases. 228 The issue then becomes whether a test
can be devised to discover this lack of impartiality before a judge's
selection.
At least one social scientist claims that the best test of attitudes
is the most direct one.229 The problem, of course, is that there is a
"correct" answer to a question about burden of proof and stan-
dard of proof-correct, that is, from the standpoint of one trained
in the American legal tradition. A judicial candidate can be rea-
sonably certain that an expression of disbelief in the concept that
the prosecution must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, will
result in an unfavorable consideration.3 0
There may, however, be a test of "prosecution-proneness" or
"defense-proneness" as developed by George Jurow in his Capital
Punishment Attitude Questionnaire.231  That questionnaire con-
sists of two parts: (1) a question regarding general attitudes to-
227. Jackson v. Virginia, 433 U.S. 307 (1979); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). But
Sf Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977) (prosecution not required to prove absence
of mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt when absence of mitigating circum-
stances is not made an explicit element of the offense).
228. An analogous situation apparently arises in New York City. There, a candidate
for a criminal court judgeship is excluded if he or she believes that the purpose of bail is
other than to assure presence at trial. Conversation between Stuart Summit, Executive
Secretary of the Mayor's Committee on the Judiciary, and R.P. Davidow, Spring, 1975.
This qualification is especially interesting, since it is supported only in dictum in Stack v.
Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951); the principle of Stack is not universally accepted in the United
States-unlike the principle of the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
229. Jurow, supra note 217, at 593.
230. In regard to a question with an obviously correct answer, there is always the prob-
lem of "deliberate dissimulation by persons who may be trying to present themselves in a
particular light." Christie & CookA Guide to Published Literature Relating to the Author-
tarian Personaliy Through 1956, 45 J. PSYCH. 171, 175 (1958).
231. Jurow, supra note 215, at 599.
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ward capital punishment;232 and (2) an inquiry into the probable
action of the respondent based on the assumption that the respon-
dent is on a jury in a capital case.233 Jurow found in one study
that answers to the second question were significantly related to
decisions in one or two mock criminal trials.23 4 Arguably, the sec-
ond question suffers from the same defect as that found in the
question about burden of proof--that is, it contains a "profession-
ally correct" response: "I would consider all of the penalties pro-
vided by law and the facts and circumstances of the particular
case." When this questionnaire was given to law students and
judges in another study, however, it was discovered that a large
number of those who did not respond to the neutral position in
regard to general attitudes, did not shift to this "professionally cor-
rect" response on the second question.235 Thus, this questionnaire
may be used effectively to test for "prosecution-proneness" or "de-
fense-proneness," although a problem remains as to the correct
standard by which to interpret the results. In the case of burden
of proof, a constitutional standard exists; in the case of the death
penalty, no such standard exists since the Supreme Court has held
that capital punishment is a permissible penalty in certain circum-
stances.23 6 Jurow's Capital Punishment Attitude Questionnaire
232. Check the one statement which best summarizes your general views about
capital punishment (the death penalty) in criminal cases:
1. 1 am opposed to capital punishment under any circumstances.
2. I am opposed to capital punishment except in a few cases where it may be
appropriate.
3. I am neither generally opposed nor generally in favor of capital punishment.
4. I am in favor of capital punishment except in a few cases where it may not be
appropriate.
5. I am in favor of capital punishment as an appropriate penalty.
Id. (emphasis in the original).
233. Assumeyou are on ajury to determine the sentence for a defendant who has
already been convicted of a very serious crime. If the law gives you a choice of
death, or life imprisonment, or some other penalty: (check one only)
1. I could not vote for the death penalty regardless of the facts and circum-
stances of the case.
2. There are some kinds of cases in which I know I could not vote for the death
penalty even if the law allowed me to, but others in which I would be willing
to consider voting for it.
3. I would consider all of the penalties provided by the law and the facts and
circumstances of the particular case.
4. I would usually vote for the death penalty in a case where the law allows me
to.
5. I would always vote for the death penalty in a case where the law allows me
to.
Id. (emphasis in the original).
234. Id. at 582.
235. Davidow & Lowe, supra note 217, at 601-07.
236. The Supreme Court has upheld death penalty statutes that attempt to limit the
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thus cannot be regarded legitimately as a test of bias, since there is
no generally accepted standard by which to determine bias. 37 If,
however, the attempt is made to achieve a balance of opinion on a
collegial court in regard to one fundamental legal issue, this test
might be of some utility. 38
A final consideration, in view of the possibility of dissimula-
tion, concerns the propriety of securing appropriate information
through a polygraph test or psychiatric examination.23 9 Each of
these techniques has its methodological problems, including the
subjectivity inherent in an analysis of the results.240 In addition,
discretion of juries by providing standards for the imposition of that penalty. Proffitt v.
Florida, 428 U.S. 42 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428
U.S. 262 (1976). The Court, however, has invalidated statutes under the following circum-
stances: mandatory imposition of death penalty (Harry Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633
(1977); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Stanislaus Roberts v. Louisiana,
428 U.S. 325 (1976)); failure to permit evidence of mitigating circumstances (Lockett v.
Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978)); and death penalty for rape (Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584
(1977)).
237. Cf. Jurow, supra note 215, at 590: "Finally, since there really is no way to know
the 'objective' truth regarding guilt or innocence, we cannot tell which groups are really
biased and which are neutral."
238. See Davidow & Lowe, supra note 217. Other questions might be devised to distin-
guish between those individuals who usually are prosecution-prone and those individuals
who usually are defense-prone. The following question is one that the author developed
and tested only preliminarily among my students in a course in Judicial Administration; it
gives some promise of being able to distinguish between these two groups:
To what extent would you, as a judge, agree or disagree with the following state-
ment? (Please circle the most appropriate number below on a scale of from +3
(strongly agree) to -3 (strongly disagree)).
If a defendant in a criminal case takes the stand and is impeached by prior incon-
sistent statements (not amounting to an admission or confession), the govern-
ment's case in chief is stronger than it would have been had the defendant not
taken the stand.
239. Although the author is not aware that either a polygraph or a psychiatric examina-
tion of a judicial candidate has ever been attempted, the suggestion that potential nominees
be screened psychologically has been made occasionally. THE AMERICAN ASSEMBLY, THE
COURTS, THE PUBLIC, AND THE LAW EXPLoSION 138 (H. Jones ed. 1965); Franks & Ken-
ner, .4 Proposal For a More Rational.Judiciary, 82 CASE & COM. 45 (Sept.-Oct. 1977); Ka-
minsky, 4 Proposalfor Mandatory Preselection Screening For State Court Judges, 51 ST.
JOHN'S L. REv. 516, 538 n.98 (1977).
240. Regarding a possible lack of objectivity on the part of psychiatrists, see Dix, The
Death Penalty, "Dangerousness," Psychiatric Testimony and Professional Ethics, 5 AM. J.
CRIM. L. 151 (1977). It is possible that a polygraph examination is less subjective than a
psychiatric examination. In one study, for example, in which seven experienced and three
inexperienced polygraph examiners were asked to review polygraph records of forty indi-
viduals whose guilt or innocence had already been "verified," 9.5% of the judgments relat-
ing to those individuals who were innocent were incorrect; 15% of the judgments relating to
those individuals who were guilty were incorrect. Experienced polygraph operators did
better than inexperienced ones; experienced operators were in error with regard to those
who were innocent in 6.4% of the judgments while they were in error with regard to those
who were guilty in 10.8% of theirjudgments. Horvath & Reid, TheReliability ofPolygraph
19811
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many people might find these techniques demeaning and thus in-
compatible with the dignity of the office. Unless we regard judges
as above all criticism, however, the former objections appear to be
the more substantial ones.
Examiner Diagnosis of Truth and Deception, 62 J. CiuM. L.C. & P.S. 276, 279 (1971). On
the one hand, it is possible to be impressed by the relatively high degree of accuracy with
which the judgments were made regarding truth or falsity; on the other hand, it is possible
to be impressed by the relatively large degree of error with respect to a technique that is
said to be so scientific. (Would such rates of error be regarded as acceptable, for example,
in regard to tests for venereal disease?).
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